COMMERCIAL SPEECH IN THE PROFESSIONS: THE
SUPREME COURT'S UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND
QUESTIONABLE ANSWERS
FRED S. MCCHESNEYt
INTRODUCTION

In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council," the Supreme Court rendered the first of several rulings extending partial first amendment protection to commercial speech.
Most of the cases that have defined and refined the "commercial speech
doctrine" have involved state restrictions on the ability of members of
licensed professions, such as lawyers, pharmacists and optometrists, to
promote themselves. Restrictions on advertising, solicitation and tradename use have all been challenged.
Although the constitutional test applied in each case has ostensibly
been the same, the degree of protection accorded by the Court under
the commercial speech doctrine has varied, depending on the type of
promotion at issue. The Court has granted considerably greater protection to advertising than to other forms of promotion. Virginia Pharmacy, which introduced commercial speech-protection, held that a state
ban on price advertising by pharmacists was constitutionally infirm. In
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,' the Court extended that holding, striking down a ban on advertising by attorneys. The Court further expanded the protection of commercial speech in In re R.M.J.,8 in which
it held that unreasonable restrictions on lawyer advertising, though
short of an outright ban, nevertheless run afoul of the first amendment.
Most recently, in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,4 the
Court struck down a state's prohibition on attorney advertising that
contained information directed at a particular clientele regarding specific legal problems. Freed by the Supreme Court from traditional state
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restrictions, "advertising by professionals . . .has increased steadily
over the past several years and looks to a healthy future."*
Restrictions on nonadvertising promotion have fared differently.
The Court in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar' ruled that the first amendment does not prevent a state from banning in-person, commercial solicitation by lawyers.' In Friedman v. Rogers," the Court upheld,
against first amendment challenge, a state's ability to ban the use of
trade names by optometrists. In both cases, the Court concluded that
the possibility of consumers being deceived sufficed to deny constitutional protection to the commercial speech in question.
Commentators' reactions to the Court's commercial speech cases
have been unusual. Almost all applaud promotion in the professions;
few accept the Court's particular delimitation of professionals' promotional rights. Noting that the Court's reasoning in the cases has rested
more on economic analysis than on traditional first amendment principles, some scholars who favor professional promotion as an economic
proposition nevertheless would not protect it constitutionally.9 Another
' Alter, No Pot of Gold, Just Satisfaction, ADVERTISING

AGE, Dec. 24, 1979, at

S-1.

6 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
7 Id.
at 468. But see In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 434-39 (1978) (Solicitation on
behalf of nonprofit, "public-interest" organization is not commercial speech and is accorded full first-amendment protection.).
8 440 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1979).
9 See, e.g., Attanasio, Lawyer Advertising in England and the United States, 32
AM. J. COMP. L. 493, 516 (1984) ("[Florbidding regulation of advertising moves toward revisiting Mr. Justice Holmes' warning of constitutionalizing a particular economic system which, in turn, narrows political choice."); Baker, Commercial Speech: A
Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L. REv. 1, 3 (1976) ("Commercial speech
lacks the crucial connections with individual liberty and self-realization which exist for
speech generally, and which are central to justifications for the constitutional protection
of speech . . ...
"); Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process
and the FirstAmendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 30 (1979) (Statutes banning drug price
advertising may be economically unwise, but should not be held unconstitutional.); see
also Canby, Commercial Speech of Lawyers: The Court's Unsteady Course, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 401, 404 (1980) ("The establishment of a standard of review for commercial speech lower than that applied to political speech is not without its doctrinal and
practical difficulties."); Canby & Gellhorn, Physician Advertising: The FirstAmendment and the Sherman Act, 1978 DUKE L.J. 543, 583 ("[T]o achieve a finely tuned
policy governing professional regulation that is responsive to economic nuances, the first

amendment is hardly the ideal instrument."). See generally T. EMERSON,

TOWARD A

n.46 (1966) (Commercial speech
"generally relate[s] to a separate sector of social activity involving the system of property rights rather than free expression."); Emerson, FirstAmendment Doctrine and the
Burger Court, 68 CAL. L. REV. 422, 458-61 (1980) (discussing several reasons why
the first amendment should not extend to commercial speech). For a criticism of attempts to consider commercial, political and other speech within a single theory of the
first amendment, see Shiffrin, The FirstAmendment and Economic Regulation:Away
from a General Theory of the FirstAmendment, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 1212 (1983).
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commentator argues just the opposite: because permitting commercial
speech is desirable as a matter of economics, it deserves the full first
amendment protection accorded political speech. x Others agree that
constitutional protection of commercial speech is warranted but find
that the Court's opinions fail to achieve continuity of analysis or consistency of result.11
The Court's refusal to extend even limited first amendment protection to nonadvertising forms of promotion such as solicitation concerns still others, who feel that a total ban on solicitation is overly
broad. 2 This objection is perhaps the most topical one today. The
American Bar Association's Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standards and the ABA's new Model Rules of Professional Conduct
continue the Court's distinction between advertising and solicitation by
permitting only the former.1 The Model Rules deem the latter
"fraught with the possibility of undue influence, intimidation, and
over-reaching. 1 14 The Rules' advertising/solicitation distinction has
elicited a sharp rebuke from the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, who charged that the continued ban on solicitation is "anticompetitive" and "generally inhibits those in most need of information
10 See Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1977); Coase,
The Marketfor Goods and the Market for Ideas, AM. ECON. REv., May 1974, at 384
(Papers and Proceedings).
11 See, e.g., Canby, supra note 9, at 401 ("We have learned to expect some theoretical inconsistency in the Court's decisions when it first opens up new constitutional
territory, and in the field of professional advertising and solicitation we have not been
disappointed."); Liebeler, The Essence of Chaos: The Supreme Court, Advertising and
the First Amendment, Wash. St. B. News, Feb. 1980, at 14, 22 (objecting to the
"wholly arbitrary manner" in which commercial speech cases have been decided); see
also Andrews, Lawyer Advertising and the FirstAmendment, 1981 AM. B. FOUND.
RESEARCH J. 967, 982 (noting criticisms of the "fluctuating rationales" of commercial
speech cases).
1" Joe Sims, a member of the Washington, D.C. Bar's Committee on Legal Ethics
and the Special Committee of the D.C. Bar on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, criticizes the ABA's maintenance of the advertising/solicitation distinction, arguing that the two are conceptually indistinguishable. See Sims, ABA Still Balks at Reasonable Advertising Reform, Legal Times, March 28, 1983, at 11, col. 2; see also
Christensen, Advertising by Lawyers, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 619, 632 ("Pressure continues to mount for a rule that would permit any form of advertising, including solicitation, that is not false, deceptive or misleading."). For citation to others critical of
prohibitions on solicitation, see Note, Soliciting Sophisticates: A Modest Proposalfor
Attorney Solicitation, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REsF. 585, 585 n.4, 589 n.25 (1983).
a See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.2 (1983) (generally
permitting advertising that is not false or misleading); id. Rule 7.3 (generally outlawing solicitation); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule DR 2-101 (Alternative Draft 1981) (generally permitting advertising that does not involve personal contact and that is not false or misleading); id. Rule DR 2-104 (generally restricting
solicitation).
14 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 comment (1983).
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about the availability of legal services from receiving them."' 15 Thus, as
the state bars take up the question whether to adopt the new Model
Rules, the viability of the distinction between advertising and other
forms of promotion is far from well accepted.
This article does not dispute the Supreme Court's decision that the
first amendment protects commercial speech, but rather joins the criticism of the developing commercial speech doctrine as it applies to promotion by professionals. The article argues that there is no principled
reason to treat nonadvertising forms of promotion differently from advertising. In reaching this conclusion, the article questions many of the
conclusions that the Court has reached in the issues it has addressed
and raises a number of issues previously ignored. Section I briefly reviews the relevant cases, and notes that, although the Supreme Court
has used a cost-benefit model to analyze commercial speech in the professions, the Court has been unable or unwilling to apply the model
consistently or coherently. Section II attempts to remedy that deficiency
by demonstrating that the Court has been remiss in ignoring a major
cost of restrictions on speech, the competitive effects of promotional
bans in the professions. The issue of consumer deception arising from
nonadvertising forms of professional promotion, which the Court has
found to require special treatment, is analyzed in Section III.
I.

COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND THE PROFESSIONS: THE DOCTRINE

In deciding whether to grant constitutional protection to particular
types of professional promotion, the Supreme Court has not relied on
traditional first amendment analysis. Rather, the Court in evolving its
commercial speech doctrine has looked to many of the same interests
protected by antitrust and consumer protection law.16 The debate in the
15 Letter from J. Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
Department of Justice, to Honorable Clement C. Torbet, Jr., Chief Justice, Supreme
Court of Alabama 5 (Sept. 21, 1984) [on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law

Review] [hereinafter cited as McGrath Letter]; see also Letter from Jonathan C. Rose,
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Policy, Department of Justice, to Robert J.
Kutak 6-7 (July 23, 1982) (calling proposed Model Rule 7.3 "too restrictive") [on file
with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review] [hereinafter cited as Rose Letter].
The Justice Department has also criticized the new Model Rules pertaining to advertising and specialization. See McGrath Letter, supra, at 6-7; Rose Letter, supra, at 89.
16 Writing after Bates, Canby and Gellhorn noted the Supreme Court's mixture
of antitrust and constitutional principles: "[The Court] reached [its] result only after a
careful rule of reason analysis, albeit under the first amendment .

. ."

Canby &

Gellhorn, supra note 9, at 579. Attanasio compared antitrust objections to bans on
solicitor advertising in England with first amendment challenges to lawyer advertising
in America and concluded that "the actual rationales underlying these doctrinal labels
are strikingly similar." Attanasio, supra note 9, at 513.
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advertising cases, for example, has concerned the effects of advertising
restrictions on prices, entry barriers and quality of services. The
Court's refusal to extend commercial speech protection to solicitation
and trade names has rested on the possibility of consumer deception, a
consideration normally ignored in analyzing political speech under the
first amendment.' 7 In essence, as the Court has admitted, the extent of
the constitutional protection afforded commercial speech depends on the
economic costs and benefits of allowing a particular form of
promotion. 8
A review of the cases, however, discloses that the Court has analyzed the costs and benefits of promotion by professionals somewhat
inconsistently. In particular, a comparison between the advertising and
the nonadvertising cases reveals numerous problems. The Court treats
critical issues, especially deception, quite differently in the two sets of
cases. In addition, issues that are apparently crucial in one set of cases
are not even raised, much less discussed, in the other set. As the following review of the major cases discloses, the result is a hodgepodge of ad
hoc, rather than principled, distinctions among the different promotional techniques used by professionals.
A.

Advertising
1. Benefits

In assessing the costs and benefits of advertising, the Supreme
Court has not had difficulty concluding that the benefits dominate. Advertising, the Court says quite simply, conveys valuable information."
The similarity between the first amendment and antitrust analyses of professional
promotion restrictions plainly appears in the Federal Trade Commission's antitrust action against the American Medical Association and a state and local medical society for
restrictions on advertising, solicitation and other commercial practices. See American
Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979), modified, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd
mem., 455 U.S. 676 (1982). Although the FTC's complaint alleged only antitrust violations, the Commission relied upon the constitutional analysis in Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), and Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), to analyze the competitive implications of the
restrictions. See American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. at 950-56. See generally Hazard,

Pearce & Stempel, Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed to Advertise: A Market Analysis
of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1084, 1087 (1983) (Participants in the debate on
lawyer advertising have failed to appreciate that "legal services are a market
commodity.").
17 See infra text accompanying notes 92-102.
18 See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 200 n.11 (1982) ("The commercial speech
doctrine is itself based in part on certain empirical assumptions as to the benefits of
advertising.").
19 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 754 (1976).
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It is the "traditional mechanism in a free-market economy" for sellers
to provide information to potential buyers.20 Advertising informs "the
public of the availability, nature, and prices of products and services,"
and so "performs an indispensable role in the allocation of resources in
a free enterprise system." 21 "In short," the Court concludes, "such
speech serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed and
reliable decisionmaking." 22
Advertising's value in conveying information means more than just
better-informed choices for consumers already using professionals. It
means also that some consumers who otherwise would not find or use
professionals at all will have the benefits of their services. In Zauderer
v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,2" for example, witnesses for the defendant attorney testified that they would not have learned of their legal claims had it not been for the attorney's advertisement. Although
opponents of lawyer advertising have argued that protecting such ad' the Supreme Court has
vertising inappropriately "stirs up litigation,"24
rejected this argument. The Court admitted in Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona 25 that advertising might lead to more lawsuits but saw this
potential increase in the assertion of legal rights as an advantage of
advertising. The Court in Zauderer re-emphasized that
we cannot endorse the proposition that a lawsuit, as such, is
an evil. Over the course of centuries, our society has settled
upon civil litigation as a means for redressing grievances,
resolving disputes, and vindicating rights when other means
fail. There is no cause for consternation when a person who
believes in good faith and on the basis of accurate information regarding his legal rights that he has suffered a legally
cognizable injury turns to the courts for a remedy .... 26
In addition to noting advertising's general role in informing consumers, the Court has recognized the importance of advertising for
20 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 376 (1977); see also id. at 397
(Powell, J., dissenting) ("[A]dvertising is the most commonly used and useful means of
providing information as to goods and other services . . . ."); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) ("Advertising .. .is .. .dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling
what product, for what reason, and at what price.").
21 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (citation omitted).
22

Id. (citation omitted).

23 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2273 (1985).

See id. at 2277-78; Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977).
433 U.S. 350, 376 (1977) ("The disciplinary rule [prohibiting lawyers from
advertising] likely has served to burden access to legal services ....
28 Zauderer, 105 S.Ct. at 2278.
24

25
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maintaining competition in the professional marketplace. Contrary to
professionals' claims that prices must rise when the costs of advertising
are added to overhead,27 the Court has noted that prices are generally
lower when advertising is allowed.2 8 Bans on advertising insulate the
seller of professional services from price competition and "open the way
for him to make a substantial, and perhaps even excessive,
profit .
*...
,,29Bates stated that the inability to advertise also erects a
barrier to the entry of new firms, and thus will benefit professionals
with more established practices.30
This contention of the majority in Bates did not go unchallenged,
however. In his dissent, Justice Powell suggested that larger, better established firms "often possess the economic power to disadvantage the
weaker or more inexperienced firms in any advertising competition." 31
The majority believed just the opposite to be true: "In the absence of
advertising, an attorney must rely on his contacts with the community
to generate a flow of business. In view of the time necessary to develop
such contacts, the ban in fact serves to perpetuate the market position of
established attorneys." 3'2
2.

Costs

In according constitutional protection to advertising, the Court addressed advertising's possible costs but found them outweighed by the
benefits of increased information and competition. General objections
that the seller's interest was largely economic" and that advertising
could be "tasteless and excessive", 34 "in poor taste"3 5 or "embarrassing
or offensive" 38 have been dismissed rather quickly. The Court gave
greater consideration to claims that allowing advertising would lower
the quality of services that professionals provide and that advertising
would foster deception of consumers. Ultimately, however, the Court
found both the quality and deception arguments insufficient to outweigh the benefits of advertising.
27

Bates, 433 U.S. at 377.

28 Id.
29 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 769 (1976).
20 Bates, 433 U.S. at 378.
11 Id. at 403 n.13 (Powell, J., dissenting).

22

Id. at 378.

11 See id. at 364; Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2276 ("[AII advertising is at least
implicitly a plea for its audience's custom .... ).
' Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 765 (1976).
"5 Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2277.
36 Id. at 2280.
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Objections that advertising has an adverse effect on quality of services have arisen in various guises, all of which the Court has rejected.
Thus, although professional associations have argued that "maintaining
a high degree of professionalism" requires a ban on advertising,"' the
Court has found "the postulated connection between advertising and
the erosion of true professionalism to be severely strained.""8 According
to the Court, "[a]n attorney who is inclined to cut quality will do so
regardless of the rule on advertising.""9 The Court's view is consistent
with the empirical evidence, which shows that quality of service is at
worst unaffected by professionals' ability to advertise, 40 and may even
be associated with a higher quality of professional service."' Moreover,
the Court's position reflects the overwhelming view of the members of
numerous professions that there is in fact no relationship between ability to promote oneself and quality of service.4 2 Finally, the Court's re" Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 766 (1976); see also Bates, 433 U.S. at 368 (challenging the State Bar of
Arizona's argument that "price advertising will bring about commercialization, which
will undermine the attorney's sense of dignity and self-worth")..
38 Bates, 433 U.S. at 368; accord Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 769 (1976) ("The advertising ban does not
directly affect professional standards one way or the other.").
'9Bates, 433 U.S. at 378; cf.Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 769 (1976) ("There is no claim that the advertising
ban in any way prevents the cutting of corners by the pharmacist who is so inclined.
That pharmacist is likely to cut corners in any event.").
40 See BUREAU OF ECON., FED. TRADE COMM'N, EFFECTS OF RESTRICTIONS ON
ADVERTISING AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICE IN THE PROFESSIONS: THE CASE OF OPTOMETRY 25 (1980) (concluding that there is no difference in levels of quality provided

by optometrists in states where advertising is permitted as compared to quality in states
where advertising is outlawed) [hereinafter cited as FTC STAFF REPORT: ADVERTISING RESTRICTIONS IN OPTOMETRY]; J. CADY, RESTRICTED ADVERTISING AND COMPETITION: THE CASE OF RETAIL DRUGS 19 (1976) (finding that there is no overall
difference in quality of services provided by pharmacists in states where advertising is
permitted when compared to services provided in states where advertising is banned);
see also Kwoka, Advertising and the Price and Quality of Optometric Services, 74 AM.
ECON. REV. 211, 215-16 (1984) (presenting findings similar to those reported in FTC
STAFF REPORT: ADVERTISING RESTRICTIONS IN OPTOMETRY, supra).
4' Research indicates that, at least in the case of legal clinics, advertising has actually been accompanied by an increase in the quality of legal services. See McChesney &
Muris, The Effects of Advertising on the Quality of Legal Services, 65 A.B.A. J. 1503,
1504 (1979) (finding that legal clinic that advertised rendered higher quality services
than lawyers who did not advertise); Muris & McChesney, Advertising and the Price
and Quality of Legal Services: The Case for Legal Clinics, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 179, 182 (stating that economic analysis of advertising indicates that "advertising will lower prices without necessarily sacrificing quality; indeed, quality may
improve").
42 See Darling & Hackett, The Advertising of Fees and Services: A Study in
Contrasts Between, and Similarities Among, Professional Groups, J. ADVERTISING,
Spring 1978, at 23, 28 (Table 2). The groups that agreed there is no correlation between promotion and competence were lawyers, accountants, dentists, and physicians.
None of the groups, however, was in favor of advertising for its respective profession.
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jection of any link between advertising and quality in its first commercial speech cases comports with its rejection of similar arguments in
antitrust actions against lawyers43 and engineers"" who claimed that
anticompetitive restrictions in the professions were necessary to maintain quality.
The Court also recognized that quality of service is already directly regulated by licensing boards in the professions: "high professional standards . . . are guaranteed by the close regulation" to which
professionals are subject.4 5 More importantly, any gains in professionalism from banning advertising come only by keeping consumers ignorant. In the legal profession, for example, many consumers, "particularly . . . the not-quite-poor and the unknowledgeable," are kept in
ignorance of lawyers' availability and so fail to assert valid legal
claims.4 One might well add that even if advertising were associated
with lower quality, that would not justify banning it. Consumers may
quite rationally prefer lower quality at lower prices.4 Being forced to
pay more for "better" services, as defined by the professions, is unlikely
to strike most consumers as higher quality. The Court found that this
"highly paternalistic approach" of maintaining professional standards
of quality violates the first amendment."'
Finally, the Court in Bates considered and rejected a number of
claims that allowing advertising by professionals would simply lead to
consumer deception. Advertising, though it may provide only some of
the information needed for an informed consumer choice, is not "inherently misleading. '49 In this evaluation, the majority again parted comId. at 32. See also

AMERICAN INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, REPORT OF
THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON SOLICITATION 11 (1981) (survey of accountants finding

that a "substantial majority believes that direct uninvited solicitation does not lower
quality of services performed by CPA's") [hereinafter cited as AICPA REPORT].
43 See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786-87 (1975).
'" See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693-

95 (1978).
"' Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 768 (1976).
46 Bates, 433 U.S. at 376-77.
47

See Lanzillotti, Competition in PublicAccounting: Issues and Impact, 1 GA. J.

ACcr. 64, 68 (1980) ("[B]uyers not only will vary the quantity and quality of service
demanded, but those who purchase low quality services would pay a lower price presumably preferring that combination to a higher quality of service at a correspondingly
higher price."); Muris & McChesney, supra note 41, at 190 ("Consumers should be
free to make their own price-quality tradeoffs for legal services just as they do for other
purchases. If consumers freely choose lower price and lower quality rather than higher
quality at higher price, this preference should be accepted as improving consumer
welfare.").
48 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
49 Bates, 433 U.S. at 372-75.
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pany with Justice Powell, who believed that lawyer advertising "inevitably will be misleading.15 0 Moreover, consistent with its rejection of
the more general quality arguments, the Court "view[ed] as dubious"
any justification for avoiding deception that was "based on the benefits
of public ignorance. ?

51

If some consumers were deceived because of material omissions in
advertising, "the preferred remedy is more disclosure, rather than
less." 52 Thus, for example, "some limited supplementation, by way of
warning or disclaimer or the like" might constitutionally be required of
professionals if consumers would otherwise be misled.5" Time, place,
and manner restrictions might be permissible in appropriate situations." If advertising was outright false, regulation to prevent associated evils would also be constitutionally permissible: "We foresee no
obstacle to a State's dealing effectively with this problem. '55 As the
Court noted, states already have statutes outlawing deceptive or mis56
leading commercial speech.

The Court added, however, that any regulation of professional advertising is subject to two constitutional constraints. First, states must
choose the least restrictive means of regulation: "Restrictions must be
narrowly drawn, and the State lawfully may regulate only to the extent
regulation furthers the State's substantial interest."5 7 And second, in
50

Id. at 391 (Powell, J., dissenting).

51 Id. at 375 (footnote omitted).
52 Id.
53 Id. at 384.
'4 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976); Bates, 433 U.S. at 384.
55 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976); accord Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84. The Court has noted that

none of the advertising in its commercial speech cases has involved falsity. See, e.g.,
Bates, 433 U.S. at 381-82.
"I See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976) (citing VA. CODE § 18.2-216 (1975) (current version at
VA. CODE § 18.2-216 (1982))). Every state now has a statute prohibiting deceptive

practices or "unfair and deceptive acts and practices." See FTC's Authority over Deceptive Advertising: HearingBefore the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 90-92 Apps A & B
(1982) (chart of statutes); see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770 (West 1985); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 2513 (1975 & Supp. 1984); GA. CODE. ANN. § 10-1-372 (1985); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 411 (West 1985); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2 (Michie/Law.
Co-op 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 570.160 (Vernon 1985); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349
(McKinney Supp. 1984); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02 (Page 1979 & Supp.
1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-3 (Purdon 1971 & Supp. 1985). These statutes
are often known as "UDAP" statutes or "Little FTC Acts," because the relevant language derives from section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1982).

67 In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); accord Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2275
("Commercial speech that is not false or deceptive and does not concern unlawful activ-
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view of the admitted benefits of advertising and consumers' constitutional right to receive it, any such regulation could not extend as far as
a ban. According to the Court, "What is at issue is whether a State
may completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information's effect
. . . [W]e conclude that the
upon its disseminators and its recipients.
'5
answer . . . is in the negative.
One argument offered by professionals in favor of total bans has
been the difficulty of enforcing more limited restrictions designed to
avoid consumer deception or falsity.59 Because the number of professionals selling services is so large, it has been urged that prior restraint
is the only realistic form of regulation. The Court rejected this argument in Bates. Reasoning that the extent and consequently the costs of
any deception that a ban might avoid paled beside the benefits of advertising, the Court suspected that
most lawyers will behave as they always have . . . . For
every attorney who overreaches through advertising, there
will be thousands of others who will be candid and honest
and straightforward. And, of course, it will be in the latter's
interest, as in other cases of misconduct at the bar, to assist
in weeding out those few who abuse their trust.60
More recently, the Court has rejected the related arguments that it is
intrinsically difficult to distinguish deceptive legal advertisements from
truthful ones and that making this distinction is more difficult for legal
services than for other products. 61
In short, a state is free to impose reasonable regulations to avoid
genuine problems but may not ban advertising altogether. A regulation
will be deemed unreasonable if a less restrictive alternative exists. The
Court applied this approach in In re R.M.J.62 to evaluate the constitutionality of a state restriction that limited the groups to whom a lawyer
could send professional announcement cards. Because the state gave no
ities .
est ...

.

. may be restricted only in the service of a substantial governmental inter.

Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 773 (1976); accord Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2275 (1985) ("[B]lanket bans on
price advertising by attorneys and rules preventing attorneys from using nondeceptive
terminology to describe their fields of practice are impermissible.").
51 See Bates, 433 U.S. at 379.
6o

Id.

"1See Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2279. The Court also noted that its views are
shared by both the American Bar Association and the Federal Trade Commission. See
id. at 2279 n.13.
62 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
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reason for its restriction, the Court surmised that the difficulty of supervising the sorts of material lawyers would send accounted for the
restriction. If so, the Court said, a prohibition on sending announcement cards to some groups was apparently more drastic than necessary
to advance any legitimate state goal. "For example, by requiring a filing with the Advisory Committee of a copy of all general mailings, the
State may be able to exercise reasonable supervision over such mailings.
There is no indication in the record of a failed effort to proceed along
such a less restrictive path."63e Because a less restrictive alternative to a
total ban on sending cards to some groups was available but not tried,
the ban was unconstitutional.
The Court reaffirmed this approach 64 in Zauderer, in which it
considered constitutional challenges to several separate restrictions on
lawyer advertising, including a ban on illustrations in advertisements.
Zauderer, an attorney, placed an advertisement in various newspapers
informing readers of the dangers of the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device and expressing his willingness to handle legal actions against the
Shield's manufacturer.6 " The advertisement included a picture of the
Shield, which the Court noted was accurate.66 The Court held that the
state's rule prohibiting the use of illustrations in legal advertisements
could not stand because the state could police the use of misleading
illustrations on a case-by-case basis.6" Furthermore, Zauderer and In
re R.M.J. both indicate that the burden of justifying promotional restrictions is on the state bar that imposes them.68 In commercial speech
Id. at 206 (footnotes omitted).
The Court has reemphasized the less-restrictive-alternative requirement in
other commercial speech cases not involving restraints on promotion in the professions.
For an application of the test that a restraint on commercial speech be "not more extensive than necessary," see Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983) (citing
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). The
requirement of less restrictive alternatives to bans on commercial speech parallels the
identical first amendment principle for political speech. See Reich, Preventing Deception in Commercial Speech, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 775, 784 & n.56 (1979) (citing cases).
65 See Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2271-72.
" See id. at 2279.
V7See id. at 2281. The state had contended that prior restraints against illustrations in advertisements were justified because the effects of illustrations were "subconscious" and so deception would be difficult to detect. Id. at 2280-81. Citing the success
of the Federal Trade Commission in policing illustrations used in advertising on a caseby-case basis, the Court found that the prophylatic approach taken by the state could
not stand. Id. at 2281. However, the Court upheld disciplinary sanctions against
Zauderer for failing to include in his advertisement information alleged by the bar to be
necessary to avoid deception. See id. at 2281-82; infra note 240.
" See Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2277 (Where advertisements are not false or deceptive, "our decisions impose on the State the burden of establishing that prohibiting the
use of such statements to solicit or obtain legal business directly advances a substantial
governmental interest."); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203 ("Even when a communication
63
"
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cases not involving professionals, the Court has similarly emphasized
that "[t]he party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech
'
carries the burden of justifying it." 69
In summary, the Supreme Court's analysis of advertising demonstrates its awareness of both the benefits and possible costs of advertising, and provides a standard for state regulation based on their relative
weights. The benefits include provision of greater information to consumers and furtherance of competition in the market for professional
services. On the cost side, the Court does not believe, as professional
associations have alleged, that advertising results in a decline in quality.
Consumer deception and false advertising are possible, though their
likelihood and magnitude are thought to be slight. In light of its analysis, the Court leaves a state free to regulate, but the burden of showing
that regulations are narrowly drawn to address particular problems remains on the state. Regulation in any event cannot extend to outright
bans on advertising.
B. Nonadvertising Promotion
When the Court turns to nonadvertising forms of promotion by
professionals, the difference in the analysis is striking. Whether the issue is solicitation by lawyers or use of trade names by optometrists, the
Court abandons the analytical framework developed in the commercial
speech cases involving advertising. The Court does not even attempt to
discuss benefits. Moreover, the test applied to measure the importance
of costs, especially deception, is much less rigorous than that found in
the advertising cases.
1. Benefits
An initial difference between the advertising and nonadvertising
lines of cases is the Court's unwillingness to recognize the benefits of
nonadvertising promotion. In Friedman v. Rogers,70 the Court simply
stated that trade names had only "ill-defined associations" with useful
is not misleading, . . . the State must assert a substantial interest and the interference
with speech must be in proportion to the interest served.").
69 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60, 71 n.20 (1983) (citing cases). For
a clear misinterpretation of this requirement, see Princess Sea Indus. v. Nevada, 97
Nev. 534, 536, 635 P.2d 281, 283 (1981) (upholding the state legislature's ban on
advertising of prostitution, even though prostitution itself was legal, because an "act of
legislature is presumed to be constitutional") (quoting State ex rel. Tidvall v. District
Court, 91 Nev. 520, 526, 539 P.2d 456, 460 (1975)), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926
(1982).
70

440 U.S. 1 (1979).
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information."1 This position elicited a vigorous dissent from Justice
Blackmun, who recognized the importance of trade names in conveying
various types of information to consumers."2 Later commentators have
been similarly unimpressed by the Friedman majority's claim that
trade names have little or no informational value.7 3 The availability of
trade names is generally seen as an important incentive to sellers to
invest in providing valuable information.7
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar 3 is likewise notable for the Court's
refusal to admit that another nonadvertising form of promotion-commercial solicitation-can be beneficial. But again, commentators have noted that solicitation may offer considerable benefits to consumers, even more than advertising does. 7 1 Ohralik's own solicitation,
in fact, considerably benefitted the two women solicited, who had been
injured in a car accident. Without the solicitation, they would have
been unaware of an insurance policy under which they eventually ob71
72

"

Id. at 12.
See id. at 20-23 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See, Andrews, supra note 11, at 980. Reich observes that
trademarks and names give sellers an incentive to invest in quality control
and promotion, to the extent that consumers are willing to pay a premium
for avoiding more costly means of discovering the goods and services they
want. Marks and names become valuable business assets precisely because, and to the extent that, they are an inexpensive and efficient source
of product information for consumers.

Reich, supra note 64, at 795-96.
According to one commentator:
[A] brand name is used to identify a product and thereby link information
to that product. This link between information and product is perfected by
the use of a trademark, for the trademark proprietor has the exclusive
right to use the mark for his product. In this way the trademark property
rights system enables investments in brand name by assuring that others,
being denied any representation by that name, cannot usefully capture returns from those investments. A seller is generally subject to less freeriding on his advertising and sales efforts, and therefore has less difficulty
in capturing the gains to whatever investments- he makes in increased
quality and brand name, when these efforts are made specific to his mark.
If, to the contrary, consumers cannot make the link from product to information clearly, then information investments yield less appropriable returns, [and] the amount of information supplied is reduced ....
Krouse, Brand Name as a Barrierto Entry: The ReaLemon Case, 51 S. ECON. J. 495,
497-98 (1984).
75 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
71 See Murdock & Pattison, Solicitation and the Legal Profession: A New Issue
for Consumer Affairs Professionals,18 J. CONSUMER AFF. 266, 283 (1984) ("One-toone communications may provide more real benefits than general advertising to the
prospective consumer of legal services. Among other reasons, such direct communications can be tailored to particular situations and clients, and they can thus do a better
job of imparting information to a lay audience.").
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tained recovery. 77 Never admitting that the solicitation was actually
beneficial, the Court disingenuously noted that if any benefits actually
accrued, the state's ban against solicitation did not "prohibit a lawyer
from giving unsolicited legal advice; it proscribes the acceptance of employment resulting from such advice." 78T Allowing the women to benefit
from the lawyer's skill and time without paying for the benefit received
was apparently of no concern to the Court. The Court's attitude was
also completely inconsistent with its recognition that Ohralik's approach to the two women was from the start a business proposition.7" If
no prospect of mutual gain to lawyer and client was foreseeable, then
the attorney had no incentive to communicate the information in the
first place. In a similar situation in the future, the information would
simply not be volunteered.
Just as Ohralik and Friedman missed the informational benefits
of nonadvertising promotion, so did they ignore the competitive benefits
of such commercial speech. Logically, one would think, the Court
would consider whether the various competitive benefits discussed in
the advertising cases-lower prices and easier entry for less established
professionals-might also be available from nonadvertising promotion.
These questions were never raised, however."'
In Friedman, the Court had to go out of its way to avoid the
competitive aspects of the promotional ban in question. The challenged
ban on the use of trade names by optometrists was part of an attempt
by "professional" optometrists to put at a competitive disadvantage
their "commercial" rivals doing business in state-wide chain stores
under a single name. The promotional restriction was actually part of
an all-out political and regulatory war against competition and for control of the profession."' The Court frankly recognized this conflict, 2 yet
7 In various conversations with the two injured women and the family of one of
them, Ohralik explained the consequences of being subject to the state's guest statute,
and of being struck by an uninsured motorist. He discovered an uninsured motorist
clause in an insurance policy, the existence or importance of which was unknown to the
injured women and their families, and under which at least one woman eventually
recovered the full policy amount. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 450. These events all occurred
during Ohralik's solicitation of the women, before they signed his contingency fee
agreement. See id. at 449-52.
78
79

Id. at 458.
See id. at 457.

80 In his Ohralik concurrence, Justice Marshall did express some misgivings
about the competitive effects of banning solicitation: "[T]he Disciplinary Rules against
solicitation fall most heavily on those attorneys engaged in a single-practitioner or
small-partnership form of practice-attorneys who typically earn less than their fellow
practitioners in larger, corporate-oriented firms." Id. at 475 (Marshall, J., concurring)
(footnote and citation omitted).
81 The Texas Optometry Act, TEx. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4552 (Vernon 1969)
(current version at TEX. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4552 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1985)),
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failed to acknowledge the deleterious effects of the trade-name ban on
chain-store optometrists which, like chain stores generally, rely on
brand-name identification to ensure repeat sales and so competitive survival."3 Although such competitive concerns were of considerable importance in the advertising cases, they went completely undiscussed in
the nonadvertising cases.
Thus, consideration of the principal benefits discussed in the advertising cases-increased information and enhanced competition-was
missing from the analysis in the nonadvertising cases. In addition, other
factors perceived as benefits of advertising were treated as costs in the
nonadvertising cases. For example, if advertising increased the amount
of litigation, that result merely indicated to the Court that some legitimate suits were not being brought without advertising. 4 In Ohralik, on
the other hand, "stirring up litigation" was one of the "substantive evils
of solicitation,"8 5 and justified its prohibition. Although in both Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council86 and Bates the Court had rejected the position that promotion compromises professionalism, 87 the Ohralik Court found that solicitation
could erode the professionalism of attorneys.88 Why advertising and solicitation produced diametrically opposite results was not explained. Finally, in Ohralik, solicitation was criticized because it "may distress the
solicited individual." 8 Yet the Court says that advertising must be permitted even though it may be "tasteless and excessive" 0 or even "offensive." 1 No attempt has been made to explain why it is constitutionally
that banned the use of trade names was enforced by the state Optometry Board. Four
of the six members of the Optometry Board had to be members of the Texas Optomet-

ric Association, the group of "professional" optometrists opposed to the use of trade
names. See Friedman, 440 U.S. at 5-6. The Optometry Board itself was established by
legislation advocated by the "professionals" after the "commercial" optometrists obtained control of the old State Board of Examiners, which regulated entry into the
profession. See id. at 17-18. The Optometry Act replaced the Board of Examiners with
the Optometry Board, see id. at 3, restoring governance of the industry to the "professional" camp.
82 Friedman, 440 U.S. at 5 ("The dispute in this case grows out of the schism
between 'professional' and 'commercial' optometrists in Texas.").
83 See Klein & Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring ContractualPerformance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 616 (1981).
"' See Bates, 433 U.S. at 376; supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
85

88

Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 461.
425 U.S. 748 (1976).

87 See Bates, 433 U.S. at 368; Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 769-70; supra text
accompanying notes 37-38.
s See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 461 & n.19.
80 Id. at 465.
90 See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765.
91 See Zauderer, 105 S.Ct. at 2280. In commercial speech cases not involving
professionals, the Court has said that, where obscenity was not involved, "we have
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relevant that nonadvertising professional speech may be distressful,
when it is irrelevant that professional advertising may be tasteless, excessive, or offensive.
2.

Costs

Although the Court found that solicitation could cause losses in
professionalism, detrimental stirring up of litigation, and distress to
some individuals, these were not solicitation's principal costs. In both
Ohralik and Friedman, the Court was more concerned with the possibility of deception. In neither case did the Court indicate that any
harmful deception had actually arisen from the particular professionals'
actions.9 2 But the Court deemed substantial the possibility of harm to
other consumers from the challenged practices. According to the Court,
"aspects of solicitation" included "fraud, undue influence, intimidation,
overreaching, and other forms of 'vexatious conduct.' "" Similarly, according to the Court, the use of trade names "enhances the opportunity
for misleading practices." 94
Particularly noteworthy in the Court's discussion of deception was
its apparent abandonment of a burden on the state to show a significant
95
chance of actual harm to consumers from possibly deceptive practices.
For example, it was enough in Ohralik for the state to claim that solidtation was "as likely as not to discourage persons needing counsel from
consistently held that the fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not
justify its suppression." Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60, 71 (1983) (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977)).
"2In Ohralik, the Court dwelt on the unsavory use of a hidden tape-recorder by
the attorney at the initial interviews with his two clients. There was, however, no suggestion that this practice caused the clients any harm. The purpose of the tape was
apparently to guard against the risk of attempted breach of contract by his clients-a
risk the attorney was quite correct in anticipating. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 451-52.
91 Id. at 462. The Court also condemned solicitation because it "may exert pressure" on consumers. Id. at 457. The Court, however, did not define "pressure," "overreaching" or "vexatious conduct." Professor Craswell notes that although the Federal
Trade Commission and the Supreme Court have attacked "high-pressure" sales, their
reasons for doing so remain obscure. "[I]n spite of this unanimous condemnation of
high-pressure sales .. .none of these authorities has been able to articulate the reasons for the condemnation." Craswell, The Identification of UnfairActs and Practices
by the FederalTrade Commission, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 107, 146. "High pressure" and
"overreaching" are not discussed here separately from deception. The remedies for possible deception that are discussed in Section III would also cure putative problems of
"high pressure" and "overreaching." See infra text accompanying notes 260-73.
" Friedman, 440 U.S. at 15.
"4 In Zauderer, by comparison, the Court rejected the state's argument that potential deception justified a ban on illustrations in advertisements: "The States's arguments amount to little more than unsupported assertions" devoid of "any evidence or
authority of any kind." Zauderer, 105 S.Ct. at 2281.
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engaging in a critical comparison . . . of legal services." 96 It sufficed
that a lawyer who solicited "may be inclined" to subordinate client interest to his own.97 Such "lapses of judgment can occur in any legal
representation, but we cannot say that [solicitation] does not create special problems of conflict of interest.""8 The Court did point to the record of "detrimental aspects of face-to-face selling" compiled by the
Federal Trade Commission as justifying the ban on lawyer solicitation;9" but that record was assembled for the Commission's rulemaking
covering door-to-door sales and had nothing to do with the selling of
legal services.1 0 0 All in all, as one commentator has noted, "the Ohralik
Court substantially lowered the state's burden of proof in justifying its
restrictions on solicitation."' ' The same was true in Friedman, in
which the Court contented itself with constructing hypothetical
problems that created a "significant possibility that trade names will be
used to mislead," though none of the supposed problems listed had actually occurred in the case.'0 2
The Court itself has not recognized the inconsistent ways it has
imposed the burden of proving deception in the nonadvertising and advertising cases. In Zauderer the Court contended, "Our recent decisions
involving commercial speech have been grounded in the faith that the
free flow of commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing the truthful
from the false, the helpful from the misleading, and the harmless from
the harmful."' 0 3 This statement is simply untrue. The Court's decisions
concerning solicitation and trade names have clearly imposed no burden
on the states to distinguish beneficial from baleful commercial speech.
Not only did the Court relax a state's burden of proving deception
in the nonadvertising cases, it also departed from two fundamental
principles it had earlier laid down for remedying any deception. First,
the Court was tolerant of a state's curing alleged deception by com" Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457-58.
Id. at 461 n.19.
98 Id.
99

Id.

at 464-65.

See Cooling-Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales: Trade Regulations Rule and
Statement of Basis of Purpose, 37 Fed. Reg. 22,934, 22,937 (1972) (codified at 16
C.F.R. § 429.1 (1985)) [hereinafter FTC: Cooling-Off Period]; infra text accompanying note 108.
101 Note, Time, Place, or Manner Restrictions on Commercial Speech, 52 GEo.
WAsH. L. REV. 127, 136 (1983).
102 Friedman, 440 U.S. at 13. "The prohibition in Friedman was a total ban on a
business practice or form of advertising because of the potential for deception .... .
Jay Norris, Inc. v. FTC, 598 F.2d 1244, 1252 (2d Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979).
10' Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2279-80.
100
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pletely banning the commercial speech in question. This remedy was
the one that was specifically denied to the states in the advertising
cases. In Ohralik, the Court sought to distinguish the advertising cases:
Unlike the advertising in Bates, in-person solicitation is not
visible or otherwise open to public scrutiny. . . . If appellant's view were sustained, in-person solicitation would be
virtually immune to effective oversight and regulation by the
State or by the legal profession . . . . It therefore is not unreasonable, or violative of the Constitution, for a State to respond with what in effect is a prophylactic rule.1 '
This analysis misreads Bates. In that case, as discussed above, the
Court rejected the enforcement argument, not because advertising
abuses were easily detectable, but because the Court doubted that widespread abuses were likely to occur in the first place.10 5 Consistent with
its distaste for comparing solicitation's costs and benefits, the Court in
Ohralik refrained from posing what logically ought to have been the
first question: is there reason to believe that deception will be a significant problem? If not, enforcement problems are largely moot.
This criticism does not necessarily deny that differences between
advertising and other forms of promotion may ultimately make a total
ban necessary. Upon finding that deception costs outweigh the benefits
of the speech in question, states perhaps should enact a ban if they are
unable to mitigate deception through lesser restrictions that preserve
the benefits of commercial speech. But the Court, in its second departure from the discussion of permissible remedies in the advertising
cases, allowed bans on nonadvertising promotion to stand without considering whether less restrictive alternatives were available to combat
deception. One commentator has recognized that "[t]he problem with
the analysis is that the Ohralik Court did not expressly consider
whether the state could prevent deception and overreaching equally
well by means of a less restrictive rule."10 6 The same must be said of
10 7
Friedman.
The Ohralik Court's citation to the FTC rulemaking on
door-to-door selling as justification for a solicitation ban was particuOhralik, 436 U.S. at 466-67 (footnote omitted).
See Bates, 433 U.S at 379; supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
106 Reich, supra note 64, at 789; cf. Note, supra note 101, at 136 ("Although the
[Ohralik] Court did not fully explain its method of inquiry, it clearly did not require
that the manner restriction be narrowly tailored to serve the asserted significant
interest ....
).
107 Reich, supra note 64, at 790 (noting that as in Ohralik, the majority in Friedman "declined to consider whether the state had less restrictive means of preventing
deception"). For a discussion of less, restrictive alternatives to avoid deception in connection with the use of trade names, see Andrews, supra note 11, at 981.
104

105
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larly anomalous. Despite finding instances of actual deception, the
FTC did not ban door-to-door solicitation but only promulgated certain
additional contractual remedies to address perceived problems.10 8 Finally, in neither Ohralik nor Friedman did the Court take note of the
fact that licensing boards (including bar associations) supposedly regulate and enforce the quality of services provided-a point the Court did
make in its advertising decisions.
In the nonadvertising cases, then, the Court has abandoned the
cost-benefit apparatus for analyzing commercial speech that it carefully
crafted in the advertising cases. Benefits of information and enhanced
competition need not be weighed against costs of deception. Restrictions
on speech need not be tailored to specific problems. Instead, entire
forms of commercial speech may be outlawed if deception, alleged but
unproved, may arise. Juxtaposing the advertising with the nonadvertising cases demonstrates fundamental inconsistencies in analyzing commercial speech in the professions; "the standards for evaluating government claims that particular commercial speech is misleading remain
open-ended. The standards are searching and skeptical when pharmacist and lawyer advertising are at issue; they are lax and trusting when
optometrist trade names are in question."1 0 9
The tension between the advertising and nonadvertising cases is
particularly obvious in the consideration of deception. In advertising
cases, even if the state can demonstrate actual deception, it must use
more circumscribed regulation than outright prohibitions to mitigate
the problem. Yet total bans on nonadvertising speech are constitutionally permissible merely to prevent possible deception-no actual deception need be shown. As a practical matter, this rule leaves the door
open for states to ban solicitation and other nonadvertising speech
merely by reciting the possibility of deception, whatever its true likelihood and extent. The result is constitutional tolerance of prior restraints on speech to prevent possible deception, though no deception
was present in the cases themselves and the extent of deception generally was unknown.
The ease with which the states have succeeded in defending bans
on nonadvertising speech suggests that solicitation, trade names and
other nonadvertising promotion are simply unimportant, or even personally abhorrent to the Court.'" In this view, the Court reflects the
108 See FTC: Cooling-Off Period, supra note 100, at 22,934 (allowing the buyer
three days in which to cancel certain door-to-door transactions).
109 Shiffrin,

supra note 9, at 1221 (footnotes omitted).

Chief Justice Burger makes no secret of his distaste for lawyers' promotion.
During his annual report to the American Bar Association in February, 1984, "the
110
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apparent opinion of the organized bar, which consistently underestimates the importance of promotional restrictions to the average practitioner.""' The Court's schizophrenic opinions are codified in the distinction between advertising and nonadvertising promotion in the
11 2
ABA's new Model Rules.
In short, both bench and bar now tolerate advertising as the traditional means of informing consumers in a free-market economy but regard other means of promotion as plagued by deception and lacking in
chief justice chastised lawyers for 'using the same modes of advertising as other commodities, from mustard, cosmetics and laxatives to used cars,' and questioned whether
the profession's 'low public standing' derives in part 'from the insistence of some lawyers on exercising their First Amendment rights to the utmost."' Middleton, Ads Pay
Off-In Image and Income, Nat. L. J., March 5, 1984, at 1, col. 1, 22, col. 4. Chief
Justice Burger's address is reprinted in Burger, The State ofJustice, A.B.A. J., April,
1984, at 62. Chief Justice Burger reiterated his criticism of advertising by lawyers at
the 1985 annual meeting of the American Bar Association. During his remarks, he
termed some advertising by lawyers "sheer shysterism" and asserted that he would "dig
ditches" before placing an advertisement were he still practicing law. See Burger Criticism Prompts Defense of Lawyer Ads, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1985, at A10, col. 2.
"I "[Tihe majority of lawyers remains reluctant to join the advertising bandwagon. And many-mostly those in large corporate firms-consider it distasteful and
unprofessional and are highly unlikely to be seen in a television commercial trying to
attract business." Middleton, supra note 110, at 22, col. 4. Robert Kutak, chairman of
the ABA's Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, claimed that promotional restrictions are a "less important" matter for any bar code of self-regulation and
ethics, and that lawyers generally agree with this assessment. See Kutak, Model Rules
of Professional Conduct: Why Do We Need Them?, 36 OKLA. L. Rv. 311, 311-12
(1983). The actual enforcement of the ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility and
state canons of ethics or codes of professional responsibility indicates just the reverse-that promotion is the single biggest issue arising under the bars' ethical rules.
Some 60% of ABA and state bar ethics opinions have concerned prohibition or allowance of various types of promotion. See Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional
Responsibility, 90 HARv. L. REv. 702, 712 (1977) (citing 0. MARu, DIGEST OF
STATE BAR ETHIcs OPINIONS 7-9 (1967)). Over a 20 year period, 80% of the opinions
of the Ethics Committee of the State Bar of Texas concerned promotion. See

Schuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons as a Group Moral
Code, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 244, 255-56 (1968) (citing Smith, The Texas Canons
of Ethics Revisited, 18 BAYLOR L. REv. 183, 192-93 (1966)).
112 See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.2 (1983) (generally
permitting advertising that is not false or misleading); id. Rule 7.3 (generally outlawing solicitation). One lawyer who reviewed the ABA's reasons for continuing to ban
solicitation has written:
[T]he ABA's stated concerns are baloney ...
. .[T]he
[
ABA's antisolicitation rule is a joke. Unfortunately, since
the ABA personifies all lawyers in the minds of many, it's a joke on all of
us, and the sort of thing that contributes to the steady decline in the prestige of lawyers in this country. The American public knows a shyster
when it sees one, and the ABA's articulated positions on this subject .. .have been obviously protectionist and inherently unpersuasive.
Sims, Lawyers' Antitrust Blanket Wears Thin, Legal Times, Oct. 15, 1984, at 14, col.
4, 19 col. 2.
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countervailing benefits.1 1 The "commercial speech doctrine" turns out
to be rather more limited than the name suggests, at least as applied to
the professions. Only advertising receives any measure of first amendment protection. Nonadvertising forms of promotion have been largely
unaffected by. the development of the doctrine.
II.

AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF RESTRICTIONS ON COMMERCIAL
SPEECH

This section analyzes the distinctions among forms of promotion
drawn by the Supreme Court in its commercial speech cases. After a
brief survey of the use of advertising versus other promotional techniques, an economic model of promotional restrictions is constructed to
analyze the sorts of bans found in the professions. The discussion concentrates on the legal profession, but other professions are also considered. The model is particularly useful for evaluating two benefits of
promotion omitted from the Court's analysis of nonadvertising techniques: consumer information and competition. It is less helpful in addressing the deception problem, which is thus considered separately in
Section III. Ignoring the deception issue, the model indicates that there
is no principled reason for treating solicitation or the use of trade
names differently from advertising. The informative and competitive effects of both can be analyzed identically. Indeed, one principal conclusion from the model is that the adverse information and competition
effects of promotional bans-those effects that so impressed the Court
in its advertising cases-are actually greater in the case of bans on nonadvertising promotion.
A.

Advertising and Other Promotional Techniques

To be profitable and so to survive, firms must not only produce
goods or services, they must sell them. In any firm, then, marketing or
promotion is a function distinct from, but no less important than, pro"' In regulating promotional practices that have not yet been considered by the
Supreme Court, states distinguish between permissible and impermissible activities according to whether they look "more like" advertising or solicitation. One state's regulations against direct mail advertising have been declared unconstitutionally vague because the court could not determine how to draw the line between elements of
advertising (permissible under the state's regulations) and elements of solicitation (impermissible) in direct mail. See Spencer v. Honorable Justices of Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, 579 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Pa. 1984). For a summary of other cases, see
Whitman & Stoltenberg, Direct Mail Advertising by Lawyers, 45 U. PT. L. REv.
381 (1984).
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duction."1 ' The distinction between production and promotion is particularly evident in service industries like law, in which there is no production for inventory storage and later sale." 5 For the law firm to
survive, lawyers must woo clients to the firm before production can
take place. Thus, firms hire some lawyers, not to produce legal services
for clients, but to specialize as "rain-makers" in attracting clients.
In fact, the very form of law partnerships reflects the need for
promotion:
In law firms, it is only the partners who participate in profit
sharing. Associates typically are paid a "straight salary" that
is not a function of firm profits. Accession to partner status
from the associate ranks is to a large extent a function of
existing partners' perception of an associate's ability to bring
in business ....
. . . Even after he becomes a partner, a lawyer's share
of the profits may not yield an income in excess of his salary
as an associate. Only with the generation of new business
does a partner become more than a slight sharer in profits.
His ultimate share depends on the contributions to firm
profits that the partner makes by attracting clients to the
firm ....

116

Lawyers need only open the American Bar Association Journal for
tips on how to win clients. 1 7 Comparable publications for other profes114

For a general analysis of different functions performed within a single firm,

see Stigler, The Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of the Market, 59 J. POL.
ECON. 185 (1951), reprinted in READINGS IN MICROECONOMICS 140 (W. Breit & H.
Hochman eds. 1971).
115 For a discussion of the importance of the distinction between production and
promotion of services by law firms, see McChesney, Team Production, Monitoring,

and ProfitSharing in Law Firms: An Alternative Hypothesis, 11 J.

LEGAL STUD.

379

(1982).
"' Id. at 391-92 (footnotes omitted).

For example, two writers have commented that
[w]hat rainmakers do so well is move a conversation with a prospective client quickly to the next step: setting a date for a meeting ....
A
lawyer can request the person's business card and offer to make a followup call or can suggest to "get together next Monday" without crossing the
ethical line into solicitation.
Smock & Heintz, Attracting Clients with Marketing, 69 A.B.A. J. 1432, 1434 (1983).
117

See also Foonberg, How a Small Firm Can Get and Keep Clients, A.B.A. J., June
1984, at 50; Goldblatt, Rainmaking with a Firm Newsletter, A.B.A. J., June 1984, at

54; Morgan, How Small Firms Can Attract Corporate Litigation, A.B.A. J., Oct.
1984, at 59; Winter, The Fine Art of Rainmaking, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1984, at 54. The
marketing literature provides similar information. See Kotler & Connor, Marketing
Professional Services, J. MARKETING, Jan. 1977, at 71.
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sions convey similarly practical information on how to generate
business.118
The need to promote as well as to produce causes particular
problems for the smaller professional firm, in which specialization in
promotion is achieved only at a greater cost in lost specialization in
production.119 Consider, for example, the difficulties faced by the sole
practitioner in law, who may lose new business simply by being out of
the office when new clients come knocking. 120 The experience of one
sole practitioner demonstrates the frustration of trying simultaneously
to produce and to promote legal work. When asked what problems he
had in starting his practice, he replied, "Getting business. This is a
great profession if someone is feeding you business. You can't get business and work at the law at the same time-you can't do both, you'd be
on the go 24 hours a day if you'd do that." 21 In larger firms, lawyers
"'

Doctors, for example, can read about "Marketing Tools," see D.

D. DECKER,

GROUP AND IPA HMOs 177
see J. EISENBERG, S. WILLIAMS

MACKIE &

(1981), or about "How to Gain and Retain

Patients,"
& E. SMITH, THE PHYSICIAN'S PRACTICE
33 (1980).
119See Stigler, reprintedin READINGS IN MICROECONOMICS, supra note 114, at
144 (discussing the problems created by the firm's undertaking "rival" functions, that
is, those functions for which "the greater the rate of output of one process, the higher
the cost of a given rate of output of the other process"). Stigler remarks that a particular problem arises "when the entrepreneur must neglect production in order to supervise marketing." Id. at 142. Frank Knight was perhaps the first to note that specializa-

tion in promotion is efficient. See F.

KNIGHT, RISK UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT

255-

57 (1971) (originally published 1921). More recently, Alchian has noted that "like any
other production activity, specialization in information is efficient. Gathering and disseminating information about goods or about oneself is in some circumstances more
efficiently done while the good or person is . . .able to specialize (i.e., while specializing) in the production of information." Alchian, Information Costs, Pricing, and Resource Unemployment, 7 W. ECON. J. 109, 110 (1969). For a discussion of the gains to
lawyers from specialization, see M. FRIEDMAN & S. KUZNETS, INCOME FROM INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 31 (1945).
120 One commentator has written:
A . .. problem for sole practitioners or very small firms is the risk
that no attorney will be available when a prospective client attempts to
contact them . . . .The availability of an attorney or partner to whom
the client can speak may sometimes prevent the loss of the client. The
same reasoning applies when an attorney plans to take a vacation. Some of
his clients will need legal counsel while he is away, and he can be more
confident that he will not "lose" these clients to a partner than he can be
that he will not lose them to another firm or sole practitioners whom they
may retain in his absence.
S. Silberman, The Market, The Firm and Delivery of Legal Services 97-98 (1975)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University). The truth of Silberman's description
is evident from the following quotation from a sole practitioner: "I saw another client,
an insurance agent. . . .He told me I lost a beautiful personal injury case while I was
away-a little boy was injured. I told him a lawyer needs a vacation-but that made
me feel bad to lose it." J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN 78 (1962).
121 J. CARLIN, supra note 120, at 169.
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carry out the two functions of obtaining and producing work more independently. The gains from specialization in producing legal services
need not be sacrificed by the need for promotion, which is itself susceptible of specialization in the hands of other lawyers.
Clients as well as lawyers value promotion, of course. Indeed, lawyers value promotion only because it satisfies potential clients' demands
for such information as services available, price schedules and office
locations. Advertising is only one of several means of promotion that
can provide this information. Other techniques observed in the various
markets for professional services include solicitation (or "personal selling," as it is often called), the use of trade names, and the payment of
referral fees. 22 Analytically, each of these promotional techniques has
much in common. 123 Each technique promotes the seller's own commercial gain, which the seller achieves by imparting valuable information to consumers.124 Each substitutes for a potentially more costly consumer search for information about sellers' fees, specialties, locations
and other characteristics. 1 25 Thus, each promotional technique poten122 See Sims, supra note 12, at 11, col. 2 ("[Aldvertising is just one form of solicitation, as are mass mailings, golf outings, club memberships, political activities, and
ambulance chasing.").
121 In Spencer v. Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court,
579 F. Supp. 880
(E.D. Pa. 1984), the court noted that although ethical rules drew a sharp distinction
between advertising and solicitation, the bar was unable to explain the difference between the two:
Whereas DR 2-101(A) permits lawyers to advertise as long as it is not
false or misleading, DR 2-103(A) and DR 2-104(A) prohibit all lawyer
self-recommendation and solicitation. Nowhere are the terms "advertising," "recommendation" or "solicitation" defined and, further, the body
charged with the responsibility for creating, interpreting, and enforcing
these rules-the defendants in this case-has refused to provide any interpretations or definitions which would solve the dilemma. Indeed, despite
repeated questioning at oral argument, counsel for defendants was unable
to draw any line of demarcation between solicitation and advertising.
Id. at 888.
124 For years economists struggled to distinguish "informative" from "persuasive"
advertising, on the theory that only the former truly benefited consumers. Most economists now realize, however, that the distinction is mere "metaphysics," Johnson, The
Economics of Advertising, in READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 410, 413 (D. Needham ed. 1970), and that the controversy is simply "a red
herring," E. MISHAN, 21 POPULAR ECONOMIC FALLACIES 115 (1970)). Every advertisement supplies some information, if only a reminder of the firm's existence and the
product the firm sells. Moreover, even "persuasive" advertising can improve consumer
welfare by promoting the rapid entry of superior products into the market, by enhancing competition and thereby lowering prices, by stimulating product innovation and by
reducing search costs for consumers. See Leffler, Persuasionor Information?:The Economics of PrescriptionDrug Ad(ertising, 24 J. L. & ECoN. 45 (1981).
125 See Grady, Regulating Information:Advertising Overview, in
THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION SINCE 1970, at 222, 222 (K. Clarkson & T. Muris eds. 1981).
Professor Grady maintains that the "main economic justification for advertising is that
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tially benefits both buyers and sellers. Each is also potentially
deceptive.
With a variety of promotional techniques available to sellers, how
do they actually promote themselves? Contrary to Justice Powell's assertion,1 26 advertising is not the traditional form of seller promotion in
the economy generally, nor is it the most important. Advertising was
not widely used before the advent of television and radio. 12 7 Only with
the rise of mass media in this century has advertising assumed its current prominence. Even today, perhaps surprisingly, "what is nominally
called advertising forms only a small part of the total resources intended to make buyers aware of goods and services." 12 Advertising
costs averaged 1.6% of sales revenues in 1975, whereas nonadvertising
promotional expenses amounted to 7.3% of sales.129
The smaller role of advertising compared with other means of promotion in the economy as a whole also holds true for the professions,
notably the legal profession." The most recent surveys indicate that
some thirteen percent of lawyers have advertised since it has been permitted." It appears, however, that many more attract business via
other means-illicit and licit. Among the illicit techniques, paid referrals from clients, fellow lawyers, and others represent, according to one
observer, "the most important source of business" for beginning lawyers. 13 2 Other commentators state that "lawyers have long known that
it reduces consumer search costs and makes consumer search more effective." Id. If it
were not cheaper for sellers to provide the information in lieu of having consumers
search for it, some sellers would cease to promote and lower their prices by more than
the cost to consumers of getting the information. Nonadvertising sellers could then drive
out of the market those sellers who continued to promote.
12 See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 397 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[A]dvertising is the most commonly used and useful means of providing information as to goods and other services . . ").
117 In 1929, advertising costs accounted for only $2 billion out of an estimated
$14.4 billion in aggregate selling costs. See Kaldor, The Economic Aspects of Advertising, 18 Rav. ECON. STUD. 1, 25 (1950).
128 Telser, How Much Does It Pay Whom to Advertise?, AM. ECON. REV., May
1961, at 194, 194 (Papers and Proceedings).
129 See Weiss, Pascoe & Martin, The Size of Selling Costs, 65 REv. ECON. &

STATiSTCS 668 (1983).
131 Since more data

on promotion are available for the legal profession than for
other professions, this section concentrates on the legal profession. When available, data
from other professions are cited. As will be seen, the data from other professions corroborate those for the legal profession. For a discussion of the relative unimportance of
advertising as compared to direct selling (solicitation) in public accounting, see Dupuy,
PractitionersForum: The Direct Solicitation Issue, J. ACcT., Oct. 1980, at 84.
131 See LawPoll, 69 A.B.A. J. 892 (1983); LawPoll, A.B.A. J., June 1984, at 48
(1984).
12 M. MAYER, THE LAWYERS 60 (1966). The Supreme Court has not considered the use of referral fees, which the bar continues to ban. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1983). The bar has never adequately explored the
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client referrals are probably the most effective means of obtaining new
work." z"3 Jerome Carlin determined that forty-four percent of lawyers
he surveyed in New York City pay clients for referring new clients.'"
Although the practice is prohibited, lawyers speak matter-of-factly
about it. 13 5 Likewise, Carlin found that fifty-six percent of lawyers survalue of referral fees to both sellers and consumers. In the case of fees paid to other
lawyers, referrals create the incentive for professionals who have less experience or
expertise in a particular subject area to pass the client on to an experienced professional
in return for a "finder's fee"-some portion of the fee ultimately paid. If referral fees
are outlawed, the first lawyer contacted can profit only by doing the work herself,
which may mean inferior service for the client. Referrals are merely a way of accomplishing between lawyers in different firms exactly what happens every day between
lawyers in the same firm, where the lawyer who first attracted a client may refer the
client to a colleague with a different specialty but still "get credit" for fees generated
when firm income shares are later allocated. See McChesney, supra note 115, at 393
n.34. The bar's justification for banning referral payments between firms appears to
rest on a belief that the size of the referral fee, rather than the superior competence of
another lawyer, will influence the referring attorney. But only a lawyer who can do
equivalent work at lower cost, or better work at the same cost, has any incentive to pay
for referrals in the first place. If the second lawyer has even less experience in a particular area than the first, it will cost that lawyer more to perform the work. The second
lawyer thus will not be able to offer a fee sufficient to bid the work away from the first.
In the case of referral fees paid to clients or other laymen, the bar's fears may
seem to have more substance, but only superficially. Nonprofessionals will naturally
refer to whichever attorney pays the highest fee, regardless of quality. But again, those
who can do the work at lowest cost can offer the highest referral fees. Even if motivated
solely by size of fee, lay referrors will nevertheless be led to refer to the most efficient
provider of professional services.
133 Smock & Heintz, supra note 117, at 1434. Client and other third-party referrals are also the two most influential factors for executives' selection of a public accounting firm. See George & Solomon, Professional Notes: Marketing Strategiesfor
Improving Practice Development, J. ACCT., Feb. 1980, at 79, 80 (Table 1) (1980).
134 J.CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHics: A SURvEY OF THE NEW YORK Crry BAR 58
(1966). The percentage figure reported in the text is extrapolated from data presented
in Carlin's Table 38. See id. (The extrapolation is obtained in the following way. First,
multiply the percentages in the table by the totals for each category of law firm, which
is given in parentheses at the bottom of each column. Next, sum these numbers. Finally, divide this sum by the total number of lawyers responding.) Carlin's final sample
included 881 lawyers practicing in the "central business core" of New York City. Of
these, 801 responded to Carlin's questionnaire. See id. at 9. He cautions that
[t]he [study's] findings cannot necessarily be generalized to all metropolitan bars, and certainly not to bars in the smaller cities. Nevertheless, of
lawyers in large metropolitan centers (over one-half million population) of
the United States, approximately one-third are located in New York City.
Furthermore, such data as there are from these other metropolitan bars
are strikingly similar to our findings in New York City.
Id. (footnote omitted).
135 Carlin quotes a sole practitioner on the use of client payments: "If they send in
business on a regular basis, I give a gratuity; if it's an occasional referral, I don't have
to. I give gratuities in about 10 to 15 per cent of the cases." J. CARLIN, supra note
120, at 81. Another sole practitioner denied giving gratuities, but added, "I get most of
my clients on referrals from other clients. So, when I wind up a case for a client, I
invite the client for drinks or lunch-it leaves a good going-away impression." Id.
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veyed pay for referrals from other lawyers, with the payments involving
a substantial cut of the fees."' 6 Finally, Carlin found that some thirtyseven percent of lawyers who spend appreciable time at court mainly
"wait around," apparently to solicit clients. 3 All in all, despite sketchy
data, one would conclude that lawyers apparently find illicit means of
promotion more useful than advertising.'
Of course, many ways of attracting business are not considered
unethical. For example, lawyers recognize that pro bono work, unpaid
legal services supposedly contributed by a law firm for altruistic or
charitable reasons, is also a form of solicitation that enhances a lawyer's
reputation and increases contacts in the community.13 9 In one study,
Philip Lochner found that lawyers take pro bono clients "in return,
'3' J. CARLIN, supra note 134, at 58. The percentage figure reported in the text
is extrapolated from Carlin's Table 38. See id. In his study of sole practitioners, Carlin
noted that most of the more successful lawyers "rely heavily on referrals from other
lawyers, several reporting that well over half their business is obtained in this manner.
The referring lawyers are rewarded, usually willingly, with a third to a half of the
fee." J. CARUN, supra note 120, at 82.
137 J.CARLIN, supra note 134, at 26. Carlin found that 37% of New York City
lawyers surveyed who spend at least two hours per week at the courts pass most of that
time "waiting around." The percentage figure reported in the text is extrapolated from
Carlin's Table 13. See id. at 26. Describing the promotional value of "waiting around"
the courthouse, Carlin quotes one criminal lawyer:
Every day . . .I'm at the Court . . . .I never liked it . . .but I
have no choice. People come into these neighborhood courts-they have no
foresight-without a lawyer and needing one. They learn to expect one
around . . . .The bondsmen, sometimes they come in and ask us to take
a case ....
J. CARLIN, supra note 120, at 107-08. Carlin comments on the lawyer's need for
"maintaining more or less regular sources of business, which means he has to give
something to the bondsmen and precinct captains." Id. at 108.
'3' A recent survey of lawyer attitudes toward solicitation found that, of those
expressing an opinion, lawyers agreed three to one that solicitation was more effective
for obtaining clients than advertising. See Murdock & Pattison, supra note 76, at 278
(Table 1).
1I A veteran solo practitioner, for example, recommends that
a young, rural, solo practitioner . ..take up public defending. He's got
to get some business or he's gonna starve to death. The courts are begging
for pauper lawyers. . . . If a young lawyer is proficient and gets acquainted around town, he'll begin to pick up probate work, damage suits
and divorces. Other lawyers who have more than they can handle will give
him some of the work they don't want.
Emmerman, City Lawyer/Country Lawyer: Solo Virtuosos, STUDENT LAW., April
1977, at 14, 59. That pro bono work is at least partly motivated by promotional rather
than altruistic interests may explain why, in a survey of lawyers' opinions of fellow
lawyers, attorneys expressed no admiration for others who engaged in pro bono activities. According to a report of the survey, "Some of the criteria used by lawyers to rank
their fellows were not anticipated by the surveyors. They expected lawyers would view
pro bono work with deference, approving a commitment to social good. They were
wrong." Cowger, What Kinds of Lawyers Do Lawyers Like Best?, 63 A.B.A. J. 787
(1977).
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most typically, for hoped-for future legal business. '140 Joining civic
clubs and organizations appears to be another popular way of making
41
personal contacts, some of which eventually ripen into business.
"Successful lawyers know that giving of their time freely to charitable
and civic associations is an excellent way . . . to help build their
practice."''

42

Law firms, particularly larger ones, make increasing use

of outside public relations firms and have even begun to employ lay
marketing directors within the firm.' 43 In short, lawyers join country
clubs and other social organizations and pursue various other schemes
to land clients-all quite licitly, despite the seeming similarity between
44
these schemes and prohibited solicitation.
140 Lochner, The No Fee and Low Fee Legal Practice of Private Attorneys, 9 L.
& Soc'y REV. 431, 463 (1975). Lochner found that the pay-off from pro bono work
might not come directly from the client served, but rather from a mutual acquaintance
who referred the client. See id. at 463. Another indication of the link between pro bono
and paid work is evident in England, where solicitors retained after giving free legal
advice at "legal aid centers" have the burden of proving that they have not unethically
"touted" themselves. See Attanasio, supra note 9, at 497.
141 One lawyer explains the rationale for membership in these groups as follows:
[L]awyers join a lot of organizations as a means of getting practice....
You just go around and impress people with your ability and personality.
You join many organizations, professional, business, lodges, social clubs,
country clubs, and politics, all designed to expand your circle of acquaintances on the theory that you are more likely to come in contact with people who need a lawyer.
J. CARLIN, supra note 120, at 126-27.
142 Davidson, Building a Law Practice, CASE & COM., Nov.-Dec. 1980, at 15.
142 See, e.g., LawPoll, 69 A.B.A. J. 892 (1983) (presenting data on law firms' use
of public relations firms); Nelson, Big Firms Continue to Emphasize Marketing Tools,
Survey Finds, Legal Times, April 23, 1984, at 1, col. 1 (survey showing "rapidly"
increasing law firm interest in public relations firms); see also Heintz, Elements of Law
Firm Competition, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 26, 1983, at 15, col. 2 (law firms "realigning their
internal management approaches to support an organizational emphasis on
marketing").
144
Despite the bar's almost monolithic stance against solicitation in
theory, incidences of solicitation are far from rare. An attorney's chummy
contacts with bankers, realtors, corporate executives and other people at a
country club [have] been a traditional means of in-person contact to attract
clients. "Most disconcerting to the notion that lawyers should not solicit
business," wrote attorney Morley Walker in the Chicago-Kent Law Review, "is that [business] entertainment is a deductible fact of a taxpayer's
life-for lawyers as well as for anyone else."

L. ANDREWS,BIRTH OF

A SALESMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION 67

(1980) (quoting Walker, Advertising by Lawyers: Some Pros and Cons, 55 CHI-KENT
L. REV. 407, 418 (1979); see also Note, supra note 12, at 596 n.63 (citing cases and
articles discussing ways lawyers legally can solicit); Note, Advertising, Solicitation and

the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181, 1204

n.142 (1972) (citing sources) [hereinafter cited as Note, Profession'sDuty].
In accounting, interviews with representatives of businesses that hire accountants
disclose that "informal solicitations do often occur through social or civic contacts with
the partners of accounting firms." Carter, Edwards, Jackson & Kirchhofer, Competi-

74

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 134:45

There are fewer data available on lawyers' use of permissible promotion than on their use of illicit promotion. But from the evidence at
hand, one would surmise that use of the various techniques is greater
than the use of advertising for the average lawyer. For example, a national survey of almost 1,500 lawyers found that 6.2% of an average
lawyer's billable time was spent doing pro bono work; almost one fifth
of the respondents spent over ten percent of their billable hours in pro
bono activity.145 As compared to the thirteen percent of lawyers who
now have advertised, sixty-two percent of lawyers did pro bono work
during nonbillable hours in the previous year (1973), at an average cost
of $2,843.4" Even with adjustment for that portion of pro bono work
that is truly altruistic, promotional pro bono work alone-not to mention club activity, public relations and all the other licit means of attracting business-appears to dwarf advertising in importance.1 47
B.

Banning Promotional Techniques by Professionals
1. The Model

Professional associations, including the bar, have traditionally permitted certain types of promotion by their members and prohibited
others. The effects of banning some promotional devices while leaving
others open to professionals can be analyzed by reference to a formal
economic model. Two rather standard assumptions are made. First, for
reasons discussed above, advertising and nonadvertising types of promotion are substitutes for one another in marketing goods and services,
though not perfect substitutes.1 4 Second, advertising and other promotional inputs are viewed as subject to diminishing returns; 149 that is,
successive doses of each promotional input yield less and less additional
return in increased sales.18 0 With these two assumptions, firms' use of
tion in Public Accounting: Issues and Impact, 1 GA. J. Accr. 74, 80 (1980).
141 See Handler, Hollingsworth, Erlanger & Ladinsky, The Public Interest Activities of PrivatePracticeLawyers, 61 A.B.A. J. 1388, 1389 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Handler].
14 See id. at 1389.
"I"Although other forms of promotion appear more useful than advertising, advertising is nevertheless valuable. Its value is attested to by figures showing that of the
13% of all lawyers who had advertised by 1984, 82% intended to continue advertising.
See King, What Works, What Doesn't, in Advertising, A.B.A. J., April 1985 at 54, 55
(1985).
148 See, e.g., R. BiLAS, MICROECONOMIc THEORY 138-44 (2d ed. 1971) (discussing substitutability among inputs).
149 For a review of the large body of evidence showing diminishing returns to
advertising, see J. SIMON, ISSUES IN THE ECONOMICS OF ADVERTISING 1-22, 223-24
(1970).
150 A managing partner of Hyatt Legal Services, the highest spending legal adver-
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promotional inputs can be modelled graphically,' which will present a
clearer picture of the effects of outlawing some inputs and allowing
others.
Substitutability and diminishing returns are shown in Figure 1,
which indicates the quantities of a good, such as professional services,
that can be sold using two hypothetical inputs, a and b. Imagine, for
the sake of concreteness, that a represents the quantity of advertising,
and b represents the quantity of pro bono work. A firm or individual
professional can combine quantities a1 and b, of each input to sell
quantity Q* of the service promoted. Because a and b are substitutes, a
firm can reduce the amount of a used without reducing the quantity
Q* of the service sold, as long as more b is added to replace the lost a.
A lawyer or law firm, for instance, could reduce advertising but manage to bill the same number of hours by increasing his contacts through
more pro bono work.
But because the returns to b diminish, the firm must substitute
successively greater units of b as a is progressively reduced in order to
sell the same quantity Q* of the service in question. A reduction from
a1 to a2 of the one input will require substitution from b, to b 2 of the
other, if the same Q* is to be sold. But a second reduction in a by the
same amount, from a2 to a3, will require a larger increase in b, from b2
to b3 , if Q* is still to be sold. Thus, diminishing marginal returns to
promotional inputs implies that constant-output curves (or "isoquants")
like Q* are convex to the origin (point 0 in Figure 1). It is important
to distinguish diminishing marginal returns to a single input from the
effects of increasing both inputs simultaneously. An increase in both
inputs allows the firm to increase the quantity of services sold. A firm
can sell Q** rather than Q* of its services by increasing both promotional inputs, for example to a4 and b4 from a1 and b1. Isoquants further from the origin therefore represent higher quantities of services
sold: Q*** is greater than Q**, which is greater than Q*.
Naturally, sellers will want to combine inputs a and b in such a
way as to minimize the total cost of promoting a given level of services.
If sellers can purchase the promotional inputs a and b at constant
prices P and Pb respectively, the total costs of selling for different
quantities of services are represented by a series of isocost or "budget"
lines, each with a constant slope of -P./Pb" The budget line simply
tiser in the country, expresses succinctly the phenomenon of diminishing marginal returns when he notes that "'[o]ver time, the percentage of persons who come to us
[because of advertising] decreases.'" Middleton, supra note 110, at 24, col. 3.
151See R. BILAS, supra note 148; C. FERGUSON, THE NEOCLASSICAL THEORY
OF PRODUCTION AND DISTRmITION (1969).
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shows the different combinations of the promotional inputs that can be
purchased with a constant promotional budget. In Figure 1, for example, the same budget can be used to purchase OR of input b and no a,
OS of input a and no b, or any combination of a and b that lies in
between on the budget line RS. Budget lines further from the origin in
Figure 1 mean greater total costs of promotion. For instance, the line
TU represents greater total promotion costs than the line RS. This relationship can be seen from the fact that with TU a professional seller
can purchase more a with no b (OU is greater than OS) or more b
with no a (OT is greater than OR) than with RS.
Promotional
input b

a2

a,

a4

Promotional
input a

Figure 1

The model in Figure 1 is helpful for illustrating the appropriate
combination of promotional inputs for the seller of professional services.
The cost-minimizing level of a and b for promoting any given level of
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service is achieved where the budget line is tangent to the isoquant
curve. The least-cost input combination for Q*, for example, is a1 and
bl, the point of tangency with budget line RS. That this point is the
least-cost combination of promotional inputs can be seen by comparing
the budget line for any other combination needed to sell Q*.If a3 and
b3 are used, for example, the higher budget defined by TU is needed to
sell Q*.Indeed, the higher cost defined by TU would actually enable a
firm or individual professional to sell a greater quantity of services,
Q**, if the two promotional input levels were changed to a4 and b4 .
Thus, a3 and b3 are inefficient combinations of promotional inputs, because the same quantity of services, Q*, could be sold at lower
cost if the same budget were allocated to the a,, b1 combination instead.
The line OC shows the series of efficient input combinations as output
sold expands, and so defines the firm's promotional "expansion path."
Only by combining promotional inputs at points along the expansion
path (OC)will a firm be selling at lowest cost.
Whether the firm actually promotes efficiently therefore depends
on its ability to choose the optimal combination of promotional inputs-those defined by the expansion path OC-for the level of services sold. In the professions, however, firms are not free to use their
preferred levels of all inputs. Some inputs, such as solicitation, trade
names and, until recently, advertising, have traditionally been banned.
To illustrate the effect of input constraints, suppose that firms are prohibited from using input a in Figure 1. Instead of combining inputs
efficiently by using the combinations of a and b along the expansion
path OC,the firm must choose the point on the vertical axis representing enough b to sell a given level of services when no a can be used. If
a firm wants to sell output level Q*, the inability to combine a with b
efficiently means that the firm must use OJ of b alone. Therefore, the
firm must incur the higher total promotion cost represented by JK to
achieve this output level, rather than the lower cost depicted by RS that
the firm would spend if it could use the prohibited input, a.
The foregoing economic model can help analyze some effects of the
Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine. Input a can represent
any banned input useful to professionals for conveying desired information to potential clients. The model demonstrates that, putting deception aside, banning any promotional input has the same effect of raising
the cost of a given level of promotion. For banned input a in Figure 1,
replace advertising with solicitation or use of trade names. Analytically,
the result is the same. The ban will prevent the professional from attaining the lowest-cost mix of inputs for selling a given level of services.
The professional therefore must substitute more of the permitted pro-
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motional device, resulting in a costlier input choice. This point has begun to dawn on consumer specialists,' 52 antitrust enforcers,'15 3 and
economists.15 4 One observes precisely the same substitution effect
55
outside the professions when one form of promotion is banned.1
When some promotional devices are banned, the substitute forms of
promotion may be less desirable than those outlawed.' 5 6 Yet, in allowing the bans on solicitation and trade names to stand, the Supreme
Court has neither asked what inputs professionals will substitute for
those banned, nor examined what effects such substitution will have.
Several effects of banning promotional inputs merit attention.
First, as a plethora of empirical studies of professions convincingly
shows, the price of services rises significantly.' 5 In the theoretical
152 See Murdock & Pattison, supra note 76, at 267 ("Removing the ban on solicitation [would offer] many of the same advantages to consumers as the removal of the
ban on advertising.").
153 Federal antitrust officials now accept that promotional restrictions in the professions have the same kinds of effects, regardless of whether the restrictions apply to
advertising, solicitation or other types of promotion. Consequently, as previously discussed, see supra note 16, the FTC has successfully challenged as anticompetitive medical associations' restrictions not just on physicians' advertising but also on their solicitation and other promotional practices. In addition, the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice has entered into a consent agreement with the Association of
Engineering Geologists, ending that group's prohibition of both advertising and solicitation. See ProfessionalAssociation Agrees to Cancel Restraints on Advertising, 46 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1166, at 1015-16 (May 24, 1984). The
Antitrust Division also is currently challenging as anticompetitive advertising and solicitation restrictions maintained by the Louisiana State Board of Certified Public Accountants. See United States v. State Bd. of Certified Pub. Accountants, No. 83-1947,
at 6-7 (E.D. La. filed Apr. 15, 1983). Most recently, the Antitrust Division has warned
state supreme courts that it considers the bar's rule banning solicitation, see MODEL

RULES

OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 7.3 (1983), to be anticompetitive and over-

broad. See McGrath letter, supra note 15; Taylor, ABA Rules on Fees and Clients
Receive Antitrust Warning, Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1984, at 16, col. 3.
15 One commentator has observed that "expenditures on advertising are only one
among several alternative methods a seller may use. . . . [D]irect regulation of the
absolute or relative amount of advertising is unwise. . . . Substitution among kinds of
promotional expenditures may be possible which would only shift the problem, not
mitigate it." Mann, Advertising, Concentration, and Profitability: The State of

Knowledge and Directionsfor Public Policy, in

INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE

153-54 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann, & J. Weston eds. 1974).
since the 1971 ban on televised cigarette commercials, tobacco
companies have responded by sponsoring "music festivals, car races, tennis tournaments
and the like," all for their publicity value. Guyon, To Tout Merit, Phillip Morris
Creates News, Wall St. J., Aug. 21, 1981, at 21, col. 3.
156 Doyle agrees that "if advertising alone were restricted, it seems likely that
other means, perhaps less desirable would be found by firms for reducing market uncertainties." P. Doyle, A Stochastic Theory of Advertising: Decision-Making and the
Theory of the Firm 227 (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Carnegie-Mellon
University).
"I See, e.g., CLEVELAND REGIONAL OFFICE, BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FED.
NEW LEARNING 137,
1'5 For example,

CONSUMER ACCESS TO LEGAL SERVICES: THE CASE
FOR REMOVING RESTRICTIONS ON TRUTHFUL ADVERTISING 126 (1984) (concluding
TRADE COMM'N, IMPROVING
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framework of Figure 1, if a professional or firm includes the average
cost of promotion in each unit of the Q* services sold, prices rise by
[(OJ-OR) PJQ*] when input a is banned. It is perhaps not selfevident that allowing promotion actually could lower prices. Promotion
is a costly process and so must be covered by the prices consumers pay.
As a result, before professional advertising became commonplace, many
believed that allowing advertising or other promotion would only raise
prices. 158 But this belief failed to reckon with professionals' desire and
ability to substitute other, less efficient (that is, more costly) promotional techniques for the inputs banned. When a form of promotion is
banned, professionals do not stop promoting. Instead of soliciting or
paying referral fees, lawyers may (and do) join country clubs and run
for political office to promote themselves and their practices.15 9 Physicians also have long promoted themselves by more costly means when
standard promotional channels were closed.'6 The traditional prohibithat various restraints on advertising all have the effect of raising prices of legal ser-vices) [hereinafter cited as FTC STAFF REPORT: AccEss TO LEGAL SERVICES]; FTC
STAFF REPORT: ADVERTISING REsTRICTIONS IN OPTOMETRY, supra note 40, at 2526 (concluding that advertising by optometrists results in lower prices); Benham, The
Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J.L. & ECON. 337, 344 (1972)
(finding that advertising restrictions increase eyeglass prices by 25% to more than

100%); Cady, An Estimate of the Price Effects of Restrictions on DrugPrice Advertising, 14 ECON. INQUIRY 493, 501-02 (1976) (finding that restraints on prescription
drug price advertising raise prices an average of 2.9%); Steiner, Does Advertising
MARKETING, Oct. 1973, at 19, 23-26 (presenting evidence
from the toy industry that advertising lowers prices).
158 See, e.g., Cady, supra note 157, at 494 ("[I]t is often asserted that price advertising increases drug prices because the cost of advertising is passed along to consumers."). The following statement typifies this widely held view:
I am not confident that additional revenues [sufficient to cover the cost of
advertising] . . . are available in the marketplace, at least in the near
term.
In the absence of a significant increase in revenue the [money] spent
on advertising . . . can come from only two sources: either the costs are
passed on to our clients in higher fees or they are absorbed by partners in
the form of reduced compensation.
Auerbach, Competition in PublicAccounting: Issues and Impact, I GA. J. Accr. 1, 11
(1980). Despite this view's popularity, the Supreme Court has correctly rejected the
claim that advertising results in higher prices. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U.S. 350, 377-78 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 768 (1976).
159 See De Alessi, Discussion, in ADVERTISING AND FREE SPEECH 98 (A. Hyman
& M. Johnson eds. 1977) ("[Ilt has been remarked that attorneys are discouraged by
the legal cartel from advertising their wares. Higher-cost substitutes, however, are
available. For example, lawyers can and do acquire and exercise the right to advertise
simply by becoming candidates for public office.").
180 For example, some doctors have hired public relations firms. See Young, Physidan Advertising-Legal and Ethical Considerations, TEx. MED., March 1983, at
79, 79 & n.1 (introduction). Others have written books and have appeared on television
talk shows to promote the books. See Hull, If the Doc's on TV, Maybe It's Because He

Lower Consumer Prices?,J.
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tion on solicitation in their profession "has made accountants masters of
the art of indirect solicitation."16 Once the possibility of substituting
inputs at higher cost is recognized, it is easier to see why banning promotional inputs would raise, not lower, promotion costs and thus consumer prices.
A second consequence of costly substitution and the resulting
higher prices is that fewer consumers purchase professional services.
Critics of advertising by lawyers have often
failed to recognize that legal services are delivered in a market . .. . . As in other aspects of economic life, consumers

assess the costs and benefits of purchasing a legal service in
light of the specific problems before them, their resources,
and their desires for goods and services of other types. Consumers will purchase legal assistance when they believe that
the transaction produces greater benefits than can be ob1 62
tained by purchasing other goods or services at that price.
Takes the PR Rx, Wall St. J., Aug. 23, 1983, at 1, col. 2. For a report of how one
dentist induced his wife to interrupt her career as a night-club singer, so she could
entertain in his office in order to increase business, see Bean, Live, From the Dentist's
Office, He-e-e-e-e-e-r-r-r-r-e's His Wife! Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1985, at 33, col. 1.
"' Bernstein, Competition Comes to Accounting, FORTUNE, July 17, 1978, at 89.
One writer observes that, with solicitation banned,
firms must content themselves with a less frontal approach, so they sponsor seminars on a variety of financial topics for the business community,
distribute booklets and brochures on accounting and tax issues and try to
land speaking engagements at meetings of various influential business
groups.
Most important, accounting firms press their people to gain entry to
the playground of corporate America by joining the "right" civic groups,
country clubs and religious organizations.
Rankin, How C.P.A.'s Sell Themselves, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1977, at Fl, col. 1, F13,
col. 1. See also Auerbach, supra note 158 at 1 (discussing competition for clients
through "indirect channels"); Bernstein, supra, at 89 (providing a thorough description
of the various ways accounting firms, particularly the largest, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
& Co., attract business without running afoul of local bans on solicitation); Mette,
Competition in Public Accounting: Issues and Impact, 1 GA. J. AccT. 18, 22 (1980)
(describing the "competitive fever" among CPA's, as indicated by their hiring public
relations advisers in an attempt to increase recognition among local businesses).
162 Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, supra note 16, at 1091-92 (footnotes omitted). If
the promotional ban were lifted, then
since the price of professional services would fall, some people-the very
poor-would be able to purchase services that were previously out of their
reach. Instead of relying on neighbors, friends, pharmacists, and magicians
for medical advice during an illness, the poor could consult physicians.
The average quality of medical advice consumed would increase even if
the average quality of medical advice given by physicians did not change.
C. BAIRD, INT'L INST. ECON. REsouRcEs, ADVERTISING BY PROFESSIONALS, 23

(1977).
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When the price of legal services falls, consumers purchase more of
these services. In particular, "middle and low income consumers who
currently do not purchase necessary legal services will be able to
purchase such services. '163 As noted earlier, the Supreme Court recognizes that lower prices will increase the quantity of legal services purchased, but has vacillated on the normative implications of increased
use of such services. According to the Court, greater resort to the legal
system as a result of advertising, by increasing consumers' reliance on
the legal system, vindicates legitimate rights, but increased use of the
system due to solicitation serves only to "stir up" litigation.""
Third, because information is more costly when some inputs are
banned, less information is actually provided; therefore, consumers who
do purchase legal services make worse-informed decisions.
"[P]rohibitions on certain forms of speech . . . [are] costly to consumers, who may not receive as much truthful, nondeceptive commercial
information as they would absent the restraints.' 16 5 Of course, consumers may substitute their own search for some of the information professionals cannot provide. But such additional search would be more expensive than if the ban were lifted and professionals could use any
promotional technique. 66 Thus, as Professor Grady notes,
[a]side from the direct benefit of the time and other resources
that consumers save, consumers receive two other benefits
from advertising. First, when search costs are reduced, consumers are more likely to find the good rather than the bad
buys; second, when sellers know that consumers are more
likely to find the good buys, they will be less disposed and
67
less able to offer bad buys.'
2.

Restrictions vs. Bans

In addition to illustrating the price and information effects of promotional bans, the economic model facilitates appraisal of the distinction drawn by the Court between outright bans and less restrictive regulation of promotion. As Figure 1 shows, the more a professional
would have used promotional input a absent the restriction, the more a
restriction on a will increase costs. If a professional may use a6 of pro163 Hazard,

164

Pearce & Stempel, supra note 16, at 1091.

See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 376 (1977); Ohralik v. Ohio

State Bar, 436 U.S. 447, 461 (1978); supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
165 Reich, supra note 64, at 794.
166 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
167 Grady, supra note 125, at 222.
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motional input a rather than none of it, the cost necessary to sell Q* of
services increases by only [(OT-OR) Pj rather than [(OJ-OR) Pj.
Thus, although a restriction increases costs in the same manner as a
ban, the extent of the restriction's adverse effect on prices and information is less.168 The price increase caused by the restriction, [(OT-OR)
P,/Q*], is less than the price increase caused by the ban, [(OJ-OR)
P,,/Q*]. The availability of services and useful information are both
functions of price changes, as discussed above. Therefore, losses in service availability and in information are reduced if promotion is restricted but not altogether prohibited.
Empirical evidence corroborates this theoretical analysis that as
the stringency of the promotional restriction increases, the extent of the
adverse effects rises concomitantly. For example, in a highly sophisticated statistical study, the staff of the Federal Trade Commission examined the separate effects of a series of promotional restrictions in the
legal profession." 9 Separate prohibitions on fee advertising, radio advertising, television advertising, and the use of handbills were all found
to raise the prices consumers pay for lawyers. The FTC study concluded that "there appears to be a continuous relationship between
prices and regulations, with the lowest prices associated with the fewest
restrictions on attorney marketing practices.'

170

Similarly, empirical re-

searchers have found positive correlations between the severity of advertising restrictions and price increases in other professions, such as phar71
macy and optometry. '
The regulation/prohibition distinction illustrates a broader point
of particular relevance for the Court's attempt to differentiate advertising from nonadvertising means of promotion. As the statistics discussed
above indicate, lawyers' use of solicitation, payments to clients, and re72
ferral fees to other lawyers all outweigh their use of advertising.1
Thus, the adverse price, availability and information effects of banning
"88 Whether it nevertheless makes sense to impose promotional regulations despite
their adverse effects of higher prices, reduced service, and limited information, depends
on the amount and cost of deception avoided. See infra notes 223-77 and accompanying
text.
189 See FTC STAFF REPORT: AccEss TO LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 157, at
126.
170

Id.

Both Benham and Cady found that increasing severity of promotional restrictions was positively related to price. Cady, for example, found that explicit prohibitions
of advertising had a greater effect on drug prices than the outlawing of "promotional
schemes," like senior-citizen discounts, though both sorts of restrictions increased prices.
See Cady, supra note 157, at 504. Benham similarly found that banning only price
advertising had a less significant effect in raising prices than did banning all advertising. See Benham, supra note 157, at 343.
317 See supra text accompanying notes 130-47.
171
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these nonadvertising promotional techniques would be considerably
greater than those of an advertising ban, all else being equal. There is
an unfortunate irony here. The Court now protects advertising in the
name of consumers but refuses to recognize that bans on other promotional inputs may have an even greater adverse impact on consumers
than did the advertising prohibition.

C.

Competitive Implications

The simple model presented in Figure 1 also provides a useful
beginning for analyzing the competitive effects of promotional restrictions imposed on professionals. A ban on a type of promotion deprives
professionals of one means of competing in the marketplace-vying to
supply better information about themselves and their services. Inability
to provide information cheaply also indirectly affects other ways firms
compete. For example, the incentive to cut prices in order to compete
more effectively diminishes when professionals cannot quickly and
inexpensively inform the public of the price reductions.' As a result,
promotional bans self-imposed by professional organizations have been
held illegal under the antitrust statutes.1 74
Nevertheless, the model in its simplest form fails to capture all the
anticompetitive effects of banning certain promotional inputs while allowing others. Implicit in Figure 1 is the assumption that all professional firms are homogeneous,that is, they have the same set of isoquant
curves and so combine promotional inputs a and b in exactly the same
ratios to produce services. Because firms differ in age, size, location and
other ways, however, it is more likely that firms would combine inputs
in different ratios. If unconstrained use of both inputs were allowed, for
example, some law firms would doubtless use more advertising while
others would use more solicitation.
This more complex situation is captured in Figure 2.

173 See Scheidell, The Price Reducing Potential of Advertising, 39 S. ECON. J.
535, 541-42 (1973).
'
See United States v. Gasoline Retailers Ass'n, 285 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1961)
(holding that an agreement among competitors to limit advertising violates § 1 of the
Sherman Act); In re American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979), modified, 638

F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that bans on physician advertising and solicitation
imposed by medical associations violate § 5 of Federal Trade Commission Act), affid
mem., 455 U.S. 676 (1982).
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Suppose that the legal profession were composed of only two groups of
firms: "leading"

firms and

"secondary"

firms. Leading firms have

respected reputations in the profession because these firms have provided quality services for many years. Secondary firms are relative
newcomers to the profession, though they provide equal quality services. Suppose further that, absent promotional restrictions, leading and
secondary firms would efficiently use the promotional inputs a and b in
different combinations to produce the same quantity Q* of services. The
isoquant curves showing the various mixes of promotional inputs are
labeled

* for the representative leading firm and Q* for the represen-

tative secondary firm. If it were free to use inputs as efficiency dictated,
the secondary firm would use less b (b s ) and more a (at) to produce
quantity Q* than leading firms, which would use more b (bL) and less
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a (aL). Although each type of firm would choose a different combination of inputs, there is no difference in the total cost of promotion between the two types of firms. The promotion budget needed to produce
Q* is depicted by RS for both firms. Thus, there is no difference in
overall promotional efficiency between the two firms, because each
spends the same amount on promotion to sell the same level of services.
If a ban on a is imposed, however, the effects differ for the two
types of firm. Neither firm may mix inputs; both must choose a level of
b, represented by a point on the b axis, that is off their expansion paths
of least-cost input combinations. But because secondary firms must cut
back more than leading firms in their use of a (from a s to 0, rather
than from a L to 0), secondary firms must substitute more of b to maintain the same level of services (from bs to bs rather than from bL to
bL). Both firms' costs of promotion rise, but costs for leading firms (OJ
X Pb) are now less than those for secondary firms (OV X Pb)The more complex model of Figure 2 illustrates how the adverse
price, availability and information effects of banning a promotional input can have important competitive implications. Before the imposition
of a ban, firms of different sorts may be equally efficient though they
combine inputs in different ratios. But firms that can produce efficiently only by using more of one input are disadvantaged competitively
when that input is banned. To substitute for the input prohibited they
must incur higher promotional costs, and then must charge higher
prices than their competitors to cover the increased cbsts. Corispondingly, firms that use less of the banned input enjoy a competitive advantage."7 5 These competitive distortions affect consumers as well. It is,
'75 This discussion of promotional input restrictions treats the costs of promoting
professional services as independent of the costs of producing them. However, restricting the use of promotional inputs may also affect a firm's production costs. Production
costs tend to fall as the level of planned production rises, due to what economists term
"economies of scale." See, e.g., Alchian, Costs and Outputs, in THE ALLOCATION OF
ECONOMIC RESOURCES 23, 23-24 (M. Abramowitz ed. 1959). In a law office, as volume rises, the use of m6re printed forms and paralegals may become cheaper. See
Muris & McChesney, supra note 41, at 183-88 (discussing these and other examples
of how volume production can lower average production costs in law firms). Because
restrictions on promotion increase the average total costs to a professional firm, firms
would find the volume of services sold would decrease, which in turn would raise the
costs of production.
For example, Benham's study of advertising bans in the eyeglass industry found
that the promotional restrictions increased eyeglass prices because they prevented firms
from attaining scale economies. See Benham, supra note 157, at 344; accord Brozen, Is
Advertising a Barrier to Entry?, in ADVERTISING AND SOCIETY 79, 99-101 (Y.
Brozen ed. 1974) (showing how the ability to promote lowers the cost of production).
For data on how advertising permitted one legal clinic to increase its volume of services
produced, see Muris & McChesney, supra note 41, at 194-95. The end of advertising
bans in the medical profession in 1982 has apparently also had the effect of encourag-
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after all, the clients of the disadvantaged firms who disproportionately
pay the higher prices, face the reduced availability of legal services and
confront the more limited information about the services they purchase.
How applicable to the legal services market is the situation portrayed in Figure 2? In fact, the data show, it captures an important
phenomenon overlooked not only by the Supreme Court but also by
most commentators. Law firms differ substantially in their choice of
promotional techniques. The "leading" and "secondary" firm labels
used in Figure 2 should be read as "large" and "small" law firms. It is
smaller law firms that systematically use more of the promotional inputs traditionally banned by state bars-advertising, solicitation, and
referral fees. This fact is shown in Tables 1, 2, and 3.
Table 1 reveals that as of 1981, lawyers in firms of less than three
lawyers are four times more likely to have advertised than those in
firms of 11 lawyers or more.176

ing high-volume clinic operations. The number of medical clinics jumped from 400 in
1982 to 950 in 1983. See Sorenson, Hospitals and Doctors Compete for Patients, with
Rising Bitterness, Wall St. J., July 19, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
In order to assess the full effect of a promotional restriction on different firms, one
must keep in mind that the production-cost effects of a promotional restriction would
not be uniform across all firms. Firms that must cut back more in their use of the
restricted promotional input not only must increase other means of promotion to compensate but also suffer greater efficiency losses in production. Thus, the total impact of
a ban on a particular promotional input is exacerbated when one analyzes differences
in production-cost effects in addition to direct promotion-cost changes.
176 One can test the statistical significance of the differences in lawyers' use of
different promotional techniques. "Statistical significance" is a term of art, indicating
the probability that differences in lawyers' use of promotional inputs by firm size as
extreme as those observed could have occurred by chance rather than because of systematic differences in their demands for such inputs. Statistical significance is measured
here by a chi-square one-sample test. For a description of this statistical test, see E.
MANSFIELD, STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMIcs 328-31 (2d ed. 1983). Chi-

square tests of the differences in lawyers' use of advertising in 1981 show that one can
reject the hypothesis that lawyers from all firm sizes have equal demands for advertising, at a significance level of .01. Thus, there is a probability of less than one in a
hundred that lawyers in firms of different sizes do not differ systematically in their
demands for advertising. [Chi-square tests on file with the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review].
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TABLE 1
INCIDENCE OF LAWYER ADVERTISING

Lawyers in Firm

Lawyers Who Have Advertised (%)

1981

1979

Less than 3

16

9

3 to 10

11

8

4

4

11 or more

Source: LawPoll, 67 A.B.A. J. 1618, 1618 (1981); LawPoll, 65 A.B.A. J. 1014, 1014 (1979)

As the percentages show, the gap has increased since 1979. More recent
figures show that the difference between larger and smaller firms has
widened even further since the last comprehensive data were reported
in 1981. By 1983, only five percent of law firms with ten or more
lawyers had advertised, while twenty-three percent of firms with three
or fewer had.117 Consequently, Justice Powell was quite incorrect in
his prediction that larger firms would use their greater resources to
disadvantage smaller firms by outspending them.771 On the contrary,
advertising has proved considerably more useful to smaller firms.
The same distinction apparently holds true for nonadvertising promotional techniques. Table 2 presents data gathered by Carlin on lawyers' indirect and direct solicitation of business while "waiting around"
for clients at courts.17 9

LawPoll, 69 A.B.A. J. 892 (1983).
See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 403-04 (1977) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
179 See J. CARUN, supra note 134, at 26.
177

178
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TABLE 2
LAWYERS SPENDING AT LEAST

Two

HOURS PER WEEK

AT COURTS WHO "WAIT AROUND"

Size of Firm

Lawyers Who Report Time
Spent at Courts is Mainly
"Waiting Around" (%)

Sole Practitioner

45

Small Firm

34

Medium Firm

23

Large Firm

11

Source: J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHIcS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CrrY BAR 26 (1966)

(Table 13). Small firms are those with two to four lawyers; medium firms, five to fourteen lawyers; and large firms, fifteen lawyers or more. See id. at 19 (Table 7).

As Table 2 shows, the percentage of those surveyed who report themselves "waiting around" when they are at the courthouse rises as firm
size decreases.1 80 Carlin also investigated the extent of lawyers' violation of the ethical provisions concerning referral payments to other lawyers and to clients (the latter of which he termed "client kickbacks").
As shown in Table 3, the extent of the ethical violations are again
highly correlated with firm size, with smaller-firm lawyers and sole
practitioners making the most referral payments."8

180

Chi-square testing of Carlin's data permits one to reject at a significance level

of .01 the hypothesis that lawyers' propensity to spend nontrial time waiting at the
courts is unrelated to firm size. Therefore, the chance is less than one in a hundred that
the differences reported in Table 2 appeared by chance. [Chi-square test on file with
the University of Pennsylvania Law Review].
' Chi-square tests indicate that differences in lawyers' use of lawyer and client
referral payments are statistically significant at below the .001 and just above the .05
levels, respectively. The chances that the differences reported in Table 3 were observed
by chance are thus one in a thousand and one in twenty. [Chi-square tests on file with
the University of Pennsylvania Law Review].
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TABLE 3
LAWYERS REPORTING UNETHICAL ACTIVITY
OCCURRING IN THEIR PRACTICES

Size of Firm

Lawyers Reporting
Client Kickbacks (%)

Lawyers Reporting
Referral Payments (%)

Small Firms

56

60

Medium Firms

23

53

Large Firms

12

37

Source: J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHics: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK Crry BAR 58 (1966)
(Table 38).

Firm size reflects only one important difference in lawyers' use of
and attitude toward various promotional devices. Younger lawyers and
lower-income lawyers tend to favor more the forms of promotion traditionally banned by the bar. Table 4 presents data showing that
younger, lower-income lawyers are far more likely to have advertised
than older, higher-income lawyers.
TABLE 4
INCIDENCE OF LAWYER ADVERTISING

Age and Income

Lawyers Who Have

Advertised (%)
Age
21
35
45
55

to 34
to 44
to 54
and older

13
13
6
1

Income
$25,00 and less
$25,001 to $35,000
$35,001 to $50,000
$50,001 and more
Source: LawPoll, 67 A.B.A. J. 1618, 1618 (1981).

31
6
13
6
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Table 5 likewise indicates that the younger lawyer is and the lower the
lawyer's income, the more favorable the lawyer is toward solicitation.
TABLE 5
LAWYERS FAVORING SOLICITATION

Age and Income

Lawyers Who Favor
Solicitation (%)

Age
21
35
45
55

to 34
to 44
to 54
and older

45
34
29
15

Income
$25,00 and less
$25,001 to $35,000
$35,001 to $50,000
$50,001 and more

41
38
36
33

Source: LawPoll, 67 A.B.A. J. 1618, 1619 (1981).

A more recent survey of lawyers corroborates the differences shown in
Table 582 Moreover, the findings reported in Tables 4 and 5 for legal

services parallel those for other professions and industries. 8
These results should hardly be surprising. One important source
of consumer information about a professional's quality is the reputation
the professional has built up through prior services to other clients.'"
Newer attorneys have had less time and fewer opportunities to build up
reputations, although the newcomers may be of a quality equivalent or
even superior to that of more established competitors. For newcomers,
182 See Murdock & Pattison, supra note 76, at 280-81 ("Lawyers with more
years of practice disagreed more strongly than their less experienced colleagues with
solicitation in person, by phone, and by mail. . . . Higher income lawyers were also
more likely to disagree that solicitation was necessary to build a practice than lower
income lawyers.").
18 Survey evidence reveals that accountants with fewer years of experience are
"somewhat more permissive in their activities toward direct uninvited solicitation."
AICPA REPORT, supra note 42, at 11. Telser also finds that in manufacturing industries newer products are advertised more heavily than those that have been on the market longer. See Telser, Advertising and Competition, 72 J. POL. EcoN. 537, 541-51
(1964).
18 See Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, supra note 16, at 1094-95.
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therefore, advertising and other promotion offer more valuable means
of communicating their location and availability. More experienced
professionals with greater investments in reputation capital have less
need for these promotional techniques.
One important result of the promotional bans traditionally imposed by the state bars, then, has been a competitive tilt in favor of
larger firms as well as more experienced, higher-income lawyers generally. In its empirical study of promotional restrictions on lawyers the
Federal Trade Commission recognized that
[i]nformative advertising also tends to lower the equilibrium price by making the entry of new firms into the market
easier. An important part of a firm's reputation is the extent
of consumer awareness that the firm is in the market. When
new firms are unable to advertise, it takes consumers a much
longer time to learn by word-of-mouth about their presence.
The new firms are kept at a competitive disadvantage during
the time that consumers are less aware of their presence than
of the older and more established firms. During this period,
the new firms will make lower profits. Potential entrants can
be effectively discouraged by the prospect of an extended period of subnormal profits.1 8 5
The Supreme Court has also noted that advertising bans can operate as
barriers to the entry of less established lawyers."8 From the evidence
presented in this section, it should be clear that nonadvertising promo18 7
tional bans have precisely the same effect.
The competitive implications of banning promotional inputs help
explain a related phenomenon: large firms have vigorously opposed
ending bans on advertising and solicitation despite the fact that they
seem to have less interest in doing either. This seeming anomaly has
been ascribed to an altruistic concern that promotion degrades the esteemed standing of the profession as a whole.1 88 But as long as competing firms differ in their use of promotional techniques, it is precisely
FTC STAFF REPORT: ACCESS TO LEGAL SERvIcEs, supra note 157, at 82.
See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 378 (1977); supra text accompanying note 30.
187 As noted above, Justice Marshall has observed the uneven burden a solicitation ban imposes: "[T]he Disciplinary Rules against solicitation fall most heavily on
those attorneys engaged in a single-practitioner or small-partnership form of practice-attorneys who typically earn less than their fellow practitioners in larger, corporate-oriented firms." Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar, 436 U.S. 447, 475 (1978) (Marshall,
J., concurring) (footnote and citation omitted); see supra note 80 and accompanying
text.
188 See Note, Profession's Duty, supra note 144, at 1203-04.
185
186
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those firms that would use banned inputs the least that stand to gain
the most from continuing the ban."8 9 The losers are firms that would.
use outlawed inputs most, that is, smaller firms. As one commentator
has asserted, "The greatest testimonial to the success of advertising has
been the geometric growth of small firms into large enterprises in the
few years since Bates."' 90
Law firms need not be direct competitors for large firms to gain
from continued promotional prohibitions. According to the model
presented in this section, ending promotional bans would cause lawyers
to reduce pro bono and other "public interest" activities and substitute
more advertising, solicitation and referral payments as means of attracting business. A significant reduction in pro bono activity would
have a profound effect on the legal profession. By donating so much of
their time to "deserving" individuals and causes, lawyers increase the
prestige of the entire bar. Sociologists who have studied the legal profession remark on this great willingness of lawyers to undertake altruistic activities that enhance the reputation of the bar as a whole."9 ' More
importantly perhaps, the considerable amount of pro bono and other
charitable work adds weight to lawyers' long-standing claim that theirs
is a service "profession," not merely a "business." '92 This generally
189 The largest and smallest firms in the legal profession may not compete with
one another. The former serve almost exclusively a business clientele, whereas the latter

serve mostly individuals. See

UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1977 CENSUS OF
SERVICE INDUSTRIES 52 (Table 9) (1981). For example, one can extrapolate from Sil-

berman's data to find that only 22% of the firms with 13-19 lawyers, compared to 76%
of the sole practitioners, report that their primary clients are individuals. See S. Silberman, supra note 120, at 88 (citing United States Census Bureau figures). Another
study divides legal practices into three types, according to whether they provide "primarily individual" legal services, "primarily standardizable" services, or a combination
of both. See Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, supra note 16, at 1101-02. Although law firms
in the first two categories do not usually compete with each other, the mixed-service
firms do compete with the firms providing standardizable services. This fact, the authors assert, explains the opposition to promotion in the profession:
Advertising would permit growth of primarily standardizable firms, and
these firms would then begin to compete for clients who would otherwise
patronize mixed service firms. As a result, mixed service practitioners
would like to prevent advertising. Because mixed service practitioners
probably constitute a majority of current legal service producers, and because they have correspondingly great power in the organized bar and in
the political system at large, these practitioners have presented an influential opposition to lawyer advertising.
Id. at 1110 (footnotes omitted).
190 Attanasio, supra note 9, at 523, 528-29 & nn.277-81.
191

See T.

PARSONS,

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in
370, 384 (1954).

ESSAYS IN

192 See, e.g., H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS (1953) (reviewing the various obligations lawyers have to the bar, the courts, their clients and their peers). Hazard, Pearce
and Stempel have drawn attention to an effect of viewing law as a profession:
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accepted distinction may explain traditional legislative willingness to allow lawyers to ban forms of promotion and otherwise regulate themselves."9 3 Today, while defending themselves against the charge that
self-regulation leads to anti-competitive cartelization, lawyers can point
to the amount of time they spend helping others as evidence that they
are members of a profession, entitling them to special treatment under
the antitrust laws.1 4
Although the benefits of the public's perception of altruistic attorneys and the enhanced business/profession distinction accrue to the bar
in general, the costs of pro bono work are not evenly distributed. One
would predict from the model presented here that the costs fall more
heavily upon smaller firms, less experienced lawyers and lower-income
attorneys who must substitute more charitable work for the banned
promotional input. In fact, the ratio of pro bono hours to all hours
worked is higher for lawyers in small firms than for those in large
The legal profession is understandably reticent to acknowledge this
tension between [the] ideal [of law as a profession] and [the] reality [of law
as a business]. One means of avoiding the unpleasant implications of this
tension is to minimize overt participation by lawyers in activities, such as
advertising, that suggest that effective legal assistance is bought and sold.
Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, supra note 16, at 1112-13 (footnote omitted).
193 Two justices of the Supreme Court believe that law is a profession and would
permit a state greater leeway in restricting lawyer promotion than if law were a business. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2295-96 (1985)
(O'Conner, J. and Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a list
of cases rationalizing advertising restrictions on the ground that law is a profession, not
a business, see Note, In Re R.M.J.: The Scope of Lawyer Advertising Expands, 1983
UTAH L. REv. 99, 100 n.16.
1" In defending against price-fixing charges arising from the use of minimum-fee
schedules, the Fairfax County, Virginia Bar unsuccessfully sought exemption from the
antitrust laws by describing law as a "profession" and claiming that "enhancing profit
is not the goal of professional activities; the goal is to provide services necessary to the
community." Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786 (1975). Although the
defense did not succeed in that case, the Supreme Court did agree that "professions"
differed from other businesses: "The public service aspect, and other features of the
professions, may require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a
violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently." Id. at 788-89
n.17; accord National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696
(1978) (reaffirming that professional services may differ significantly from other businesses); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982) (maintaining the business/profession distinction, but holding it inapplicable to the defendant
doctors).
More recently, a Federal Trade Commission administrative law judge pointed
with approval to the business/professional distinction in dismissing an antitrust complaint against an association of trial lawyers charged with illegal price-fixing and boycotts. In re Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, No. 9171, slip op. (FTC Oct. 18,
1984). It remains in the professions' interests, therefore, to encourage activities perceived as public service. But see Comment, Antitrust and the Professions: Where Do
We Go from Here?, 29 VILL. L. REv. 115, 145-49 (1984) (predicting that courts will
no longer treat professionals differently under the antitrust laws).
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firms.19 As members of the bar, large-firm lawyers benefit from the
increased pro bono work other lawyers undertake to compensate for the
banned input.
D.

Predation Through Promotional Restrictions

To the extent that promotional restrictions in the bar disadvantage
some firms while favoring others, they are predatory. Considerable
literature and case law have developed on the ways firms can use predatory pricing to force rivals out of business in order to obtain market
power for themselves.1 96 Verifiable instances of predatory pricing have
been far fewer than the volume of writing on the subject would suggest,197 but the tactic of below-cost pricing to drive competitors from the
market has nonetheless been used. 9 8 If competition can be reduced by
the forced exit of rival firms, the surviving predator can raise prices and
try to recoup earlier losses with monopoly profits. Predatory pricing
has risks, however, because it requires the predator to incur a certain
loss in the present with no guarantee that there will be future gains, or
that any such gains will suffice to cover the initial loss.
The apparent benefit of promotional input restrictions to lawyers
in more established, larger firms raises the question whether some
groups in the bar use promotional constraints predatorily to increase
competitors' costs. Predatory cost increases have been less exhaustively
discussed in the literature than predatory pricing. 9 9 But the two are
related. If a predator can increase competing firms' costs, those firms
must increase prices and so lose sales. If competitors' costs can be raised
significantly so that enough sales are lost, competitors may even be
forced out of business. Forcing cost increases on rivals thus works like
195

See Handler, supra note 145, at 1392 (finding that amount of pro bono work

is higher for sole practitioners than for the average lawyer in larger firms). For example, while 32.6% of sole practitioners report that more than 10% of their total hours
were spent in public-interest work only 10% of larger-firm lawyers do that much public-interest work. Id.
19 The most celebrated case is doubtless Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1 (1911).
'97 For a discussion of the theoretical problems with predatory pricing and for
citations to numerous empirical studies questioning the frequency of the practice, see K.
CLARKSON AND R.

MILLER, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: THEORY, EvIDENCE AND

PUBLIC POLICY 255-57 (1982).
19I For discussion of one apparently successful episode of predatory pricing, see
Yamey, PredatoryPrice Cutting: Notes and Comments, 15 J.L. & ECON. 129, 137-42

(1972).
19
Several economists have developed elements of a theory of cost predation. See
Salop and Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, AM. ECON. REV., May 1983, at 267
(Papers and Proceedings); Oster, The Strategic Use of Regulatory Investment by Industry Sub-Groups, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 604, 610-12 (1982).
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predatory pricing, because the object of both is to reduce competition by
forcing competitors out of the market. But cost predation has one clear
advantage over predatory pricing: it does not require the predator to
incur short-run losses before reaping any longer-run gains. Competitors
bear all the losses, while the gains accrue immediately to the predator
that can force up its rivals' costs.
Cost predation has disadvantages relative to predatory pricing,
however. It is easy, albeit painful, to cut one's own price below costs,
but firms generally have no means of increasing their competitors'
costs. They must convince an outside party with some power over the
industry to impose the costs. This outside agent could be Congress, a
union, a government agency-or a self-regulating professional
association.
Facially neutral input restrictions imposed on an entire profession
may be a more subtle form of predation than predatory pricing (and so
may be more defensible in court). But cost predation can work only if:
(1) one industry group is able to persuade an outside agency to impose
cost-increasing restrictions, and (2) a significant difference exists among
firms in their use of the restricted input.20 0 When these two conditions
hold, input cost predation becomes more than just a theoretical
possibility.20 1
200 In one commentator's words:

As long as there is some initial difference among firms in an industry,
different firms in that industry may push for regulations which increase
the relative rate of return to their peculiar characteristics. Indeed, a firm

may even encourage passage of a regulation which reduces industry demand or increases industry costs. The firm may encourage such regula-

tions because they differentially damage its rivals, and thus rearrange
market shares at the same time they reduce the total market. To go one
step further, the firm may even encourage a regulation which lowers its
short-term profits if that regulation simultaneously reduces the ability of
its rivals to compete effectively.
Oster, supra note 199, at 606.
201 The use of input restrictions for predatory purposes is illustrated by the events
culminating in United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). A labor
union and one group of coal producers conspired in collective bargaining to increase
industry wages in order to disadvantage another group of employers. On its face, the
collective agreement was neutral: wages were set higher for all firms, including the
conspiring producers. But there was considerable variation in firm size, and labor used
per ton of coal produced was greater among smaller firms. A higher union wage was
an attractive predatory strategy for larger firms, because they were the less labor-intensive producers. See Williamson, Wage Rates as a Barrierto Entry: The Pennington
Case in Perspective, 82 Q.J. EcoN. 85, 90-98 (1968). Williamson notes that
the sine qua non for wage premiums even to be seriously contemplated is
that [there be] differences in technology between large and small scale
firms . . . . Most important, the labor/capital ratio must be larger for
the small scale operators. If differences in labor/capital ratios between
scales are insignificant, the incentives to influence the condition of entry
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Because law firms do differ in their use of promotional inputs, the
question must be posed whether the bar's promotional restrictions are
actually designed to benefit some lawyers at the expense of others. Figure 2 demonstrates that regardless of state bars' motivations in imposing promotion restrictions, the effect is to penalize small firms and their
clients. If one may infer intent from effect, one would surmise that intentional cost predation has truly been responsible for the restrictions.
As Stigler says, "The announced goals of a policy are sometimes unrelated or perversely related to its actual effects, and the truly intended
effects should be deduced from the actual effects." 20 2 At a minimum,
because some firms stand to gain from the restrictions, one must consider the possibility that anticompetitive gain rather than quality concerns or avoidance of deception is a substantial reason for the bars'
traditional prohibitions on promotion. The question is of paramount
importance for the commercial speech cases, of course. If potential deception is merely a pretext for the restrictions on solicitation, trade
names and other nonadvertising speech, there is less reason to deny
through the use of wage premiums are correspondingly attenuated.
Id. at 98.
Several studies have found other instances of predatory increases in competitors'
costs via input restrictions. See, e.g., Maloney & McCormick, A Positive Theory of
Environmental Quality Regulation, 25 J.L. & ECON. 99 (1982). Maloney and McCormick examined federal restrictions on the use of polluting or hazardous inputs, and
found that an input constraint affects firms' wealth differentially, depending on the
amount of the input used in firms' production. Id. at 117, 122. They concluded that
favored producers may even work with environmental or health groups, not so much to
reduce pollution or health problems, but to impose costs on disfavored industry rivals.
Id. at 121-22. Other environmental regulations have made it more difficult for small
plants to compete with large rivals. See Pashigian, How Large and Small PlantsFare
Under Environmental Regulation, REGULTION, Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 19. Another
study explains English child-labor laws as a device to transfer wealth to firms using
less child labor than their competitors. See Marvel, Factory Regulation:A Reinterpretation of Early English Experience, 20 J.L. & ECON. 379, 380. (1977). Similarly, state
maximum-hour statutes on the employment of women apparently benefited males and
other labor groups at the expense of women, rather than protecting women's health.
See Landes, The Effect of State Maximum-Hours Laws on the Employment of Women
in 1920, 88 J. POL. ECON. 476 (1980).
One researcher has found an instance of predatory behavior in legal constraints on
the use of promotional inputs. See Coase, Payola in Radio and Television Broadcasting, 22 J.L. & ECON. 269 (1979). Coase finds that differences in the type of music sold
by record companies led to the banning of "payola" in the broadcast industry. These
differences had made payola more useful to some firms than others. Payola was especially valuable in promoting "rock and roll." Its use in the 1950's enabled smaller,
independent companies that produced "rock and roll" to make substantial inroads on
the market shares of the major record companies, which sold more traditional music.
These latter firms were the ones that took the lead in having Congress outlaw payola in
1960.
202 Stigler, Supplementary Note on Economic Theories of Regulation, in THE
CInzN AND THE STATE 137, 140 (1975) (emphasis deleted).
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these promotional techniques the constitutional protection accorded
advertising.
Though the anticompetitive effect of promotional restrictions is
clear, there is insufficient evidence at this point to resolve conclusively
the question of what truly motivates state bars to outlaw certain promotional inputs. It seems unlikely that predatory motives underlay the
original bans on promotion, because law firms were far more homogeneous and thus more equally affected when the first ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics were adopted in 1908.03 The significant disparities
in law-firm size now observed °4 did not develop until the 19201s.205
But the fact that law firms today do differ considerably in their use of
promotional inputs means that the courts should be mindful of the unequal burdens that promotional input restrictions impose and should at
least consider whether self-interest rather than the public interest explains the bars' reluctance to end the restrictions.
The characterization of bars as motivated by gain for some of their
members contrasts sharply with the view offered by some of a benevolent, public-spirited bar genuinely concerned with problems of professionalism and consumer deception.20 6 But it coincides with a growing
perception among those studying the organized bar more closely who
find that the bar represents the interests of some lawyers at the expense
of others.207 Many lawyers find that the issue in state bar regulation,
Canon 27 stated that "solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or
by personal communications, or interviews, not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional." CANONS OF ETmICS Canon 27 (1908), reprinted in AMERICAN BAR
FOUNDATION, OPINIONS OF THE COMMrITEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 75 (1967).
2o
Just under one-half of all lawyers in private practice are sole practitioners,
according to the most recent data. See AMERICAN BAR FOUND., THE 1971 LAWYER
STATISTICAL REPORT 15 (Table 7) (1972). At the same time, large firms of even hundreds of lawyers are increasingly prominent. See Cantor, Law Firms Are Getting Bigger . . . And More Complex, 64 A.B.A. J. 215 (1978).
"' See J. CARLIN, supra note 120, at 19. Carlin notes that "[u]ntil the end of the
nineteenth century there were probably no firms with more than half a dozen lawyers. . . . The large firm as we know it today did not appear until the twenties . . . ." Id. (footnote omitted).
208 See, e.g., Boden, Five Years After Bates: Lawyer Advertising in Legal and
Ethical Perspective, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 547, 554 (1982). Boden argues that the bar
has based its opposition to changes in promotional rules not on economic interests, but
on a "genuine concern for the preservation of professional standards," "worry concerning the impact of advertising overhead in the cost of legal services," fear of approval of
general solicitation and rejection of "a long held and deeply rooted aversion to the
commercialism which advertising epitomizes." Id.
207 See, e.g., J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE
IN MODERN AMERICA 50 (1976) (arguing that in the early 1900's, ethics rules were
"applied by particular lawyers to enhance their own status and prestige"); L. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION OF LAW 45-46 (1971) (recognizing the possibility of bar associations being used as agents of one group to oppress another); Freedman, Advertising and Soliciting: The Case for Ambulance Chasing, in VERDICTS ON
203
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including restrictions on promotional inputs, has not been the attorneyconsumer relation as much as a large-firm/small-firm question.'" 8 For
them, the only meaningful way to understand the bar's traditional prohibition against the promotional inputs of greatest use to smaller firms
"is as a complex and heretofore successful conspiracy in restraint of
trade."20 9 Finally, the depiction of promotional restrictions in the professions as predatory is consistent with the widespread view that many
activities of the licensing professions, though typically justified as protecting consumers, really are designed more to protect professionals.' 0
LAWYERS 94, 96-97 (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1976) (stating that the principle
purpose of bar anti-solicitation rules is to reduce competition among attorneys); see also
Cappell & Holliday, Professional Projects of Elite Chicago Lawyers, 1950-1974,
1983 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 291, 338 (quantitative study showing that once a
group of lawyers attained membership on board of Chicago Bar Association, it "pursued its specialized interests").
Abolition of unified bars has even been urged, partly because of their inability to
reconcile conflicting interests among different factions of lawyers. See Schneyer, The
Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept: Generalizingfrom the Wisconsin Case, 1983
AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 1. The validity of the unified bar concept is beyond the
scope of this article. It is appropriate, however, to note that to many the real explanation for the existence of integrated bars lies in the benefits integration offers, not for the
public, but for lawyers themselves. See, e.g., Sorenson, The Integrated Bar and the
Freedom of Nonassociation-ContinuingSiege, 63 NEB. L. REV. 30, 36-38 (1983).
The benefits to lawyers may explain why "fu]p to 1950 the only thoroughgoing activity
of the organized profession with reference to its own housekeeping was the drive for the
'integrated bar."' J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS
365 (1950).
208 See Schuchman, supra note 111, at 245-46.
209 J. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 98 (1978).
21o See Gellhorn, The Abuse of OccupationalLicensing, 44 U. CHL L. REV. 6, 25
(1976) ("Only the credulous can conclude that licensure is in the main intended to
protect the public rather than those who have been licensed or, perhaps in some instances, those who do the licensing.").
As with integration of the bar, see supra note 207, the interplay between occupational licensing and promotional bans in the professions lies beyond the scope of this
article. It is interesting, however, to note that despite claims that licensing is needed to
protect consumers from substandard work studies have failed to find any systematic
relation between licensing and quality of goods and services. See Hogan, The Effectiveness of Licensing: History, Evidence, and Recommendations, 7 L. & Hum. BEHAV.
117 (1983); see also Carroll & Gaston, Occupational Licensing and the Quality of..
Service: An Overview, 7 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 139 (1983) (concluding that in general
occupational licensing in the professions results in better quality for some consumers,
but not for society as a whole). Except for licensed professionals themselves, few would
quarrel with Gellhorn's assessment that occupational licensing is merely occupational
protectionism. See, e.g., Benham, The Demandfor OccupationalLicensure, in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND REGULATION

13, 23-24 (S.Rottenberg ed. 1980); Smith,

Production of Licensing Legislation: An Economic Analysis of Interstate Differences,
11 J. LEGAL STUD. 117, 125 (1982). The scholarship of at least a generation has
consistently concluded that licensure primarily benefits the licensee rather than the

public. See, e.g., M.
GELLHORN,

FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM

137-60 (1962); W.

RESTRAINTS 105-51
Economics of OccupationalLicensure, in ASPECTS OF LABOR

INDIVIDUAL

FREEDOM

AND

GOVERNMENTAL

(1956); Rottenberg, The
ECONOMIcS 3, 3-14 (1962). But skepticism about the stated public-interest purposes of
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Geoffrey Hazard and his co-authors pose and answer the question succinctly: "If advertising by attorneys is beneficial for consumers . . . why has the bar resisted it? The most obvious explanations
reflect the structure of economic and political interests within the
bar."

21 1

In summary, the Court's commercial speech cases largely overlook
the actual reasons for which, some observers feel, state bars impose promotional restrictions. Use of restrictions to disadvantage one's competitors goes essentially unconsidered in the cases. Instead, the focus is on
the bar's claims about how much truthful information consumers can
expect to receive. The issues of competition and consumer information
are not unrelated, however. The more lawyers can compete by promoting themselves, the lower prices will be and the more information consumers will have. Moreover, the information facet of commercial
speech may be quite secondary in the bar's regulation of promotional
inputs. As Christensen has somewhat acerbically observed, "Lawyers'
attitudes toward advertising generally depend upon whether they have
a satisfactory client base. Those with well-established practices often
find advertising crass if not unethical. Those without such a client base
see a professional obligation to make legal services available to all seg'212
ments of society through advertising.
The use of promotional restrictions to advance some groups' interests at the expense of others is not limited to to the self-regulatory professions.21 The potential for predatory abuse in regulating promotion
suggests, however, that the link between stated purpose and actual intent should be examined more carefully in cases involving promotional
restrictions in the professions. To repeat, it is not necessary to believe
that the professionals' motives are anticompetitive to appreciate that the
licensing goes back at least as far as Adam Smith. See Stigler, OccupationalLicensure
OccuPAToNAL LicENSuRE AND REGULATION, supra, at 348,
349-50. In light of the centuries of disinterested inquiry concluding that occupational
regulation helps primarily the regulated, the Supreme Court's unquestioning acceptance of professionals' arguments justifying promotional bans seems all the more
remarkable.
211 Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, supra note 16, at 1110.
212 Christensen, supra note 12, at 619.
21 See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). In Metromedia the Court held San Diego's restrictions on billboard advertising unconstitutional. According to the plurality, the regulations violated the first amendment because
they prohibited all billboards containing noncommercial speech while only partially
prohibiting billboards containing commercial speech. See id. at 512-17. Although the
Court did not consider the possibility, one commentator has argued that the restrictions
were "unrelated . .. to [their] avowed purposes of increasing traffic safety and protecting scenic beauty" but instead favored some firms at the expense of their competitors. See Leffler, The Prohibition of Billboard Advertising: An Economic Analysis of
the Metromedia Decision, I S. CT. ECON. REv. 113, 128 (1982).
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results of their promotional restrictions must be. Even if the bar acts
for the best of motives, genuinely concerned about consumer deception
rather than about aggrandizing some lawyers at the expense of others,
the result must be damage to competition as long as attorneys differ in
their use of the outlawed input. There is, in short, no way to avoid the
competition issue, even if the more dire accusations about the bar's motives are rejected.
E. ConstitutionalImplications
It might be argued that considerations of competition can be ignored as secondary in the commercial speech cases, which concern matters of constitutional rather than antitrust law. The argument fails, for
two reasons. First, as discussed above, the commercial-speech variant of
the first amendment rests explicitly on economic rather than more
traditional free-speech criteria.2 14 Second, recognition of the differential
impact that promotional restrictions have on lawyers raises a constitutional issue at least as important as the commercial speech doctrine: the
due process requirement that one's property interest not be adjudicated
by those who have an economic stake in the outcome.
The leading case is Gibson v. Berryhill.1 5 In Gibson, the Alabama Optometric Association filed with the State Board of Optometry
charges of unprofessional conduct against optometrists who operated
commercial optometric departments in stores. The commercial optometrists were not members of the Association; all members of the State
Board were. Alleging denial of due process, the commercial optometrists sought to enjoin the State Board proceedings. The district court
granted the relief, noting that the issue was not one of actual bias, but
whether there was an "indication of a possible temptation to an average
man sitting as a judge to try the case with bias."2 ' The Supreme Court
unanimously agreed:
Because the Board of Optometry was composed solely of optometrists in private practice for their own account, the District Court concluded that success in the Board's efforts
would possibly redound to the personal benefit of members
of the Board, sufficiently so that in the opinion of the District Court the Board was constitutionally disqualified from
hearing the charges filed against the appellees.
214
215
218

1971)).

See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
411 U.S. 564 (1973).
Id. at 571 (quoting Berryhill v. Gibson, 331 F. Supp. 122, 125 (M.D. Ala.
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.. . [A]pplying the standards taken from our cases,
[the District Court] concluded that the pecuniary interest of
the members of the Board of Optometry had sufficient substance to disqualify them, given the context in which this
case arose. As remote as we are from the local realities underlying this case and it being very likely that the District
Court has a firmer grasp of the facts and of their significance
on this recto the issues presented, we have no good reason 217
it.
affirm
we
and
conclusion
its
ord to overturn
Notable in the Court's opinion is its willingness to recognize the
"context" and the "local realities" underlying the commercial restrictions. The same economic "realities"-use of restrictions to benefit one
group at the expense of another-may underlie the bar's restrictions on
commercial speech. At a minimum, the data show, the result of the
restrictions is to benefit one group, large firms, at the expense of another, small firms. Even if the bar is not anticompetitively motivated in
promulgating its restrictions, its adjudicative enforcement makes it possible for some groups to benefit at the expense of others. The dominance of better established, larger firms in the governance of bar affairs
makes due process fears all the more reasonable."' 8
In the Supreme Court's commercial speech cases, the due process
problem of bias in adjudication has arisen only once, in Friedman v.
Rogers,2' 0 which arose from facts strikingly similar to those in Gibson. 2 In Friedman, however, the Court did not consider the issue
Id. at 578-79. The Court remanded the case on other grounds. Id. at 579-81.
Large-firm domination of the bar is evidenced by the proportionately small
representation of sole practitioners elected to chair state bar associations. Sole practitioners comprise almost 50% of the legal profession, see supra note 203, but over 90%
of state bar chairmen in 1982 practiced in partnerships, according to a state-by-state
examination by the author of bar chairmen's firm affiliations as listed in MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY (114th ed. 1982). The percentage was practically
the same in 1975, before Bates.
This domination of the bar by established and prominent lawyers is not merely a
recent phenomenon. Chief Justice Burger observes that, when founded, the ABA was
regarded as "an assemblage of the elite-of the Establishment." Remarks of Warren E.
Burger, Dedication of the American Bar Center 1 (Aug. 5, 1984) [on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review]. The ABA "was an establishment-oriented
organization quite satisfied with the status quo." Burger, supra note 110, at 62.
21- 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
220 In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985), the
state's enforcement of its promotional restrictions raised a different due process issue
stemming from the bar's varying theories of the case at various stages of the disciplinary proceedings. Despite the changes in the state's rationale for disciplining Zauderer,
the Court held that the notice and opportunity to be heard were sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of due process. See id. at 2283-84.
117
218
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because Rogers sought a declaratory judgment against the Board's regulations themselves, instead of questioning the due process implications
of their possibly unconstitutional enforcement against him later.221 Due.
process might have been an issue in Ohralik, in which the soliciting
attorney had been publicly reprimanded by the disciplinary board of
the state bar (a sanction increased to indefinite suspension by the Ohio
Supreme Court), "22 but apparently the issue was not raised.
The fact that most commercial speech cases have arisen in the selfregulating professions suggests that the Court will eventually be
presented with a case raising both first amendment and due process
issues. As long as firms in the self-regulating industry are not alike in
their use of promotional techniques, some potential for bias arises in
enforcement of promotional restrictions. Recognition of the problems
for competition that differences in input use creates should force litigants and courts to consider whether potential bias amounting to denial
of due process is not at least as important as the problem of potential
deception.
III. THE DECEPTION ISSUE
Absent deception, as the previous section demonstrated, prohibitions on commercial speech harm consumers and competition in a variety of ways. Promotional bans raise prices and reduce both the availability of professional services and the information provided to
consumers. They also punish firms that would use more of the promotional input in question. Because the bans benefit some professionals at
the expense of their competitors, serious due process questions may
arise in the enforcement of the bans, in addition to the concerns for
consumers and competition that the bans should elicit.
Predation may not be the reason for the bans, however. They may
in fact be explained as disinterested attempts to prevent consumer deception-the rationale accepted by the Court in Ohralik and Friedman. Ineluctably, there is a feeling of dkja vu about this argument for
promotional bans. Protecting quality of services was long the bar's defense for blatantly anticonsumer, anticompetitive practices such as minimum fee schedules.2 23 But even if promotional bans are genuinely motivated by fear of consumer deception, the Court's decisions in the
nonadvertising cases, holding that merely potential deception justifies a
221

See Friedman, 440 U.S. at 18-19.

See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 452-54.
See Note, A CriticalAnalysis of Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedules, 85
HARV. L. REv. 971, 982-85 (1972).
222
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ban on commercial speech, are incongruous. As explained in Section I,
a weighing of the potential deception avoided by a ban against the benefits of allowing the commercial speech would be more logical and consistent with other commercial speech cases.
It cannot be denied that substantial deception may exist. A proper
cost-benefit test might conclude that the costs of deception outweigh the
benefits of allowing the speech and that no means short of a ban are
available to control the deception. But the reverse may also be true.
Deception may be inconsequential, and less drastic means than a ban
may effectively control it.
A principal objection to the Court's analysis in the nonadvertising
cases, then, is the failure to raise the questions it did consider in the
advertising cases: how extensive would deception actually be if the
speech were allowed and are less restrictive means available to mitigate
it? These are largely empirical questions, about which the Court
presented no evidence. The available data indicate, however, that deception is unlikely to be a serious problem and that many devices short
of a ban, including market forces themselves, may adequately constrain
it.
A.

The Deception Issue in Perspective

Before the extent of deception is examined, the issue must be put
in perspective. Any speech, commercial, political or, other, is potentially
deceptive, because a speaker cannot prevent listeners from misinterpreting the words used.22 4 Even the most honest speaker cannot control
completely the inferences that audiences draw from a speech. Words
rarely have a single meaning, and some consumers may attach the
wrong interpretation to speech that is truthfully spoken and correctly
interpreted by most.22 5 If minimizing deception were the sole issue,
2214John Locke noted the difficulty created when "any word does not excite in the
hearer the same idea which it stands for in the mind of the speaker." Locke, An Essay
ConcerningHuman Understanding,in 35 GREAT BooKs OF THE WESTERN WORLD
85, 286 (R. Hutchins ed. 1952). For a recent example of this phenomenon, see Fedor,
CalculatorAds Show That Truth in Advertising Can Mislead, Wall St. J., Jan. 16,
1985, at 31, col. 1.
225 Jacoby and his colleagues caution against too quickly blaming an advertiser
when some consumers miscomprehend the message:
Given that the receivers of communication messages differ substantially in terms of their past experiences and present "semantic expectations," it is not surprising to find substantial levels of miscomprehension.
There is no need to attribute malevolent motives to an advertiser in order
to understand how receivers may misinterpret an advertising message.
Jacoby, Nelson, & Hoyer, Corrective Advertising and Affirmative Disclosure Statements: Their Potentialfor Confusing and Misleading the Consumer, J. MARKETING,
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therefore, one would simply ban all speech-a patently silly solution.
Yet it is the solution adopted by the professions and upheld by the
Court to mitigate possible deception in the nonadvertising cases.
Deception can, and doubtless does, arise in every line of commerce
and industry, yet rarely are commercial speech bans imposed. One
must ask why the professions merit different treatment. Some commentators cannot find any reason: "The 'evils of unrestricted solicitation' is
rhetorical overkill. Certainly a lawyer can be annoying and can overreach. People can be injured by fraudulent or misleading solicitation.
But these problems are not unique to the legal profession. There is no
justification for a uniquely restrictive solution." '2 6 Bans on professional
speech might make some sense if there were reason to believe that deception is a bigger problem in the professions than in other industries.
There is no evidence that it is. Thus, no compelling reason exists to
apply special constraints to professional promotion in the name of
avoiding deception.
Indeed, there is good reason to believe that deception is less of a
problem in the professions than in other lines of commerce. Professionals depend on repeat business and recommendations from others for
their livelihood. Surveys show, for example, that most consumers who
use lawyers locate them through recommendations of friends, relatives
and the like.22 The percentages vary among sources,22 but the mesWinter 1982, at 61, 69. For judicial recognition of this proposition, see FTC v. Sterling
Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 675 (2d Cir. 1963) (stating that most words have alternative
definitions, "but if that in itself were a sufficient legal criterion [for deception], few
advertisements would survive"); In re Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282, 1290 (1963) (noting
that people "may be misled by even a scrupulously honest claim"); see also Reich,
supra note 64, at 783 ("Even the most straightforward and truthful communication
may mislead those who take it too literally, give it too much credence, misunderstand its
substance, or draw false implications from it.").
2 Sims, Lawyer Solicitation Rules, LITIGATION, Winter 1981, at 22, 59.
227
The Benson Commission (in England) stated that close to half of
first-time users found their solicitors by relying on what it characterized as
"personal or informal contacts." These were the recommendations of
friends, relatives, neighbors, or-for 9%-personal acquaintance with the
solicitor or a member of his firm. Similarly, in America, 52% of first-time
users and 53% of later users selected lawyers on the basis of recommendations, the vast majority of whom were relatives, friends, neighbors, fellow
workers, or business acquaintances. An additional 33% of first-time users
and 31% of later users knew the lawyer personally in a non-legal context.
Attanasio, supra note 9, at 521 n.225 (citations omitted).
228 In contrast to the figures reported by Attanasio, id., another survey found that
in choosing an attorney 58% of consumers relied on a personal acquaintance with a
lawyer and 33% used recommendations from friends. Smith & Meyer, Attorney Advertising: A Consumer Perspective, J. MARKETING, Spring 1980, at 55, 60 (Table 1).
The Smith-Meyer survey is also interesting for its findings as to information sources
consumers do not use. "[Miuch of the information that has been available to consumers
from bar associations (referrals) and/or from attorneys in yellow pages list-
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sage is always the same: a potential client's familiarity with a lawyer
and recommendations from others "dominate the selection process for
personal services.

' 229

A lawyer in the habit of deceiving only reduces

the likelihood of repeat business and favorable recommendations or referrals from past clients.28 0 Deception, therefore, is simply a less attractive business strategy to professionals than to other businessmen not so
dependent on ongoing relationships with customers. However possible
deception might be, it is not in most professionals' interest to practice it.
In fact, one would predict that professionals would affirmatively seek to
avoid unintended misperceptions by keeping commercial messages simple and by inserting qualifying language where necessary.23 1
There is a second market corrective for any incentive to deceive
that sellers might otherwise have. Much promotion, to use Professor
Grady's term, is a "search complement.

' 23 2

It is designed to induce the

listener to get more information from other sources about the professionals who promote, rather than to rely solely on the promotional
messages themselves. If professionals have deceived or disappointed
others, their advertising only causes consumers to ask others about them
and so speeds dissemination of information about their previous deception or shortcomings. Thus, those who have better records of satisfying
consumer demands have a greater incentive to promote themselves;
ings . . .has been the least used. This suggests that bar associations have not allowed
attorneys to communicate information about useful evaluative criteria." Id. at 60.
229 Smith & Meyer, supra note 228, at 59.
'30 See generally Klein & Leffler, supra note 83, at 217 (When substitutable
goods exist, production of a good below consumers' quality expectations will cause consumers to cease purchasing from the deceptive producer.).
231
To the extent that the seller's future sales depend on his maintaining a reputation for reliability, he can be expected to exercise self-restraint
in his claims and to invest in ways (like disclaimers and warnings) to
reduce the likelihood of deception. Such a seller does not want consumers
to misperceive his claims, and thereby underinvest in additional search,
because any resulting consumer dissatisfaction with his product or service
may harm future sales. Disappointed consumers are apt to distrust the
seller's subsequent claims and may also induce family and friends to stop
relying on those claims. In these situations, there is no reason for outside
intervenors-licensing boards, federal regulators, or the courts in the exercise of their first amendment jurisdiction-to attempt to define a more
optimal level of restraint on commercial speech.
Reich, supra note 64, at 794 (footnote omitted). This argument does not imply that no
deception will occur. If deception is costly for sellers to avoid, at some point the costs of
avoidance will exceed those of deception itself, and sellers will therefore not incur the
costs of avoidance. But since the benefits of reducing deception in this case are less than
the costs, regulatory efforts to remove any remaining deception will cost more than they
are worth.
'22 See Grady, supra note 125, at 227; see also Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, supra
note 16, at 1099 ("Advertising tends to cause consumers to seek information about the
producer's reputation and about other consumers' direct experience with him.").
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those who have failed are more likely to remain silent.2"3 Far from
encouraging deception, promotion can actually reduce the amount of
deception by encouraging consumers to learn more about other consumers' experiences-bad as well as good-with professional sellers.
Knowing this, sellers who disappoint or deceive will not be the ones to
advertise most.
A seller's incentive to promote deceptively, therefore, is constrained
by a desire for repeat business and by the realization that promotion
creates a demand for information about past performance. Sellers' incentives, however, reflect only half the process of potential deception.
Deception requires not only a deceiver, but a deceived. The deception
problem "can be easily exaggerated if one simply looks at the incentives
of advertisers to deceive without considering the incentives of consumers
not to be deceived." 2 ' Even if a professional intends to mislead, buyers
often recognize the self-interest in laudatory promotion, discount it appropriately, and seek corroboration from others who have dealt with
235

the advertiser.

Further, even if a promotional message initially misleads a consumer, the deception may not ultimately cause harm.23 ' Whether actual
harm ensues depends on several factors. First, because "advertising is
rarely, if ever, the only source of information about products and
prices,' 21

7

a client may correct any misperceptions before harm results.

Moreover, since much promotion is a "search complement," deception
is even less likely to result in harm. Such promotion is intended only to
convey the message that the consumer may have a problem that a professional could solve. This message seeks to induce its audience to contact a professional, at which point more informative discussions will
follow concerning the exact nature of the services, their timing, and
See Nelson, The Economic Value of Advertising, in ADVERTISING AND SOCIsupra note 175, at 48, 50 ("The consumer is right in his belief that advertised
brands are better. The better brands have more incentive to advertise than the poorer
brands."). For instance, those who offer better prices tend to advertise more. See infra
text accompanying note 243. See generally Jordan & Rubin, An Economic Analysis of
the Law of FalseAdvertising, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 527 (1979) (finding that the economics of advertising indicate little incentive to deceive the consumer).
24 Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729, 749 (1974).
235 Hazard, Pearce and Stempel argue that "because the advertising information
comes from an impersonal source, consumers often pay little or no attention to it. Similarly, the obviously biased source of the message encourages them to seek corroboration
through other available reputation information." Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, supra
note 16, at 1097.
236 The distinction between misrepresentation and harm is well recognized. A
speaker may knowingly misrepresent a material fact, but only if the hearer is harmed
thereby will an action for fraud or deceit lie. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 105, at 728 (W. Keeton ed. 1984).
"' Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, supra note 16, at 1094 (citing sources).
23
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cost. In public accounting, for example, fully ninety-five percent of
C.P.A. firms sign a written "engagement letter" with their audit clients
specifying the terms of the auditing agreement.2 3 Legal clinics are likewise in the practice of using initial consultations to explain fee structures, despite the fact that previous promotion may already have imparted information on that subject.2" 9 Even if the initial advertisement
or solicitation contained misleading information about a term of the
professional service contract, subsequent negotiations between professional and client could dispel any misperception before substantial
harm resulted.24
Even if some speech genuinely and harmfully deceives, the net effect of permitting commercial speech may actually be to reduce total
consumer misperceptions. Consumers are apparently quite ignorant
about important aspects of professional services. For instance, in the
mid-1970's, the ABA Standing Committee on Lawyer Referral Service
found that lawyers in over three-quarters of the eighty-five referral
services reporting charged ten dollars or less for an initial half-hour
consultation, and that none charged more than twenty dollars. 41 At the
same time, the ABA Special Committee to Survey Legal Needs found
in a survey of over 2,000 individuals that most overestimate considerably the cost of such a consultation. Some thirty-five percent of responSee Van Son, Guy & Poots, Engagement Letters: What Practice Shows, J.
AccT., June 1982, at 72, 74 (Exhibit 1). Further, those firms not using engagement
letters omit them because they have "long-standing relationships with their clients"
who presumably are aware of the firm's quality and fees. Id. at 76.
139 See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Hyatt, Nos. 83-1479 and 83-1845
(Md. Cir. Ct. April 11, 1984) (finding that any misperceptions created by a legal
clinic's use of promotional brochure were cured at the initial consulation, when fees
were fully disclosed and a fee agreement signed), dismissedfor lack ofjurisdiction, 302
Md. 683, 490 A.2d 1224 (1985).
240 Relying on subsequent point-of-sale negotiations to correct any client misperceptions may, however, not always be successful. In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2271-73 (1985), for example, the Dalkon Shield advertisement mentioned that cases would be handled on a contingency basis, but was
attacked for failing to inform potential clients that they would still be liable for costs, as
opposed to legal fees, in the event of an unsuccessful action. The Court upheld the
reprimand of Zauderer for failing to include information about costs. See id. at 228182. Yet Zauderer had entered into a comprehensive retainer agreement with his clients
that specified the details of the contingency fee and explicitly stated that "out-of-pocket
costs incurred or advanced" by Zauderer's firm must be borne by [the client]." Id. at
2288 n. 6 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). In addition, this retainer agreement
explained the recoverable sums to which the contigency fees would be applied. Even if
the potential for deception from the advertisement was as clear as claimed, see id. at
2283, the majority did not explain why the disclosures at the point of sale were any
worse than disclosures deemed necessary in the ad itself, or how consumers were
harmed by having them in the agreement rather than the advertisement.
241 ABA Consortium on Legal Services & the Public, ALTERNATIVES, Jan. 1976,
at 17 (special issue).
238
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dents making an estimate believed the charge would be twenty-one to
thirty dollars, and forty percent estimated the cost to be thirty-one dollars or more.2 2 The fact that prices are actually lower than what prospective clients believe is precisely the sort of information that professionals have every incentive to communicate. Not surprisingly, the
empirical evidence from the professions, including law, shows that it is
those professionals selling at lower prices who advertise more.24 If professionals are able to promote lower prices, existing misperceptions that
arise from the paucity of commercial information will be dispelled.
Even assuming arguendo that the commercial speech is deceptive to
some, it will reduce misperceptions that others already have. Any defensible evaluation of deception in commercial speech must tally old
errors corrected, not just new ones created.24 4
Finally, even if deception were a major problem in the professions,
it does not follow that banning promotion would lessen the incidence of
deception. Indeed, it is at least equally plausible that the correlation
between promotion and deception is negative, not positive. Vigorous
promotion increases consumer information and lowers the cost of shopping for a "second opinion." Promotion also imprints sellers' names
and their services more indelibly in consumers' minds. Increased identification lowers the attractiveness of deception for fear of discouraging
42 Id.; see also B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC 234-36 (1977)
(finding that consumers who had never used lawyers' services were more likely than
previous users to express the opinion that lawyers charged more for their services than
they were worth).
243 Optometrists who advertise have lower prices than those who do not. See FTC
STAFF REPORT: ADVERTISING RESTRICTIONS IN OPTOMETRY, supra note 40, at 195.
Three studies find that prices charged by lawyers who advertise are less than those who
do not. The FTC study of lawyer promotion found that
in almost every case where there are specific findings, the results showed
that attorneys who advertised a specific service tended to provide that service to the public at a lower price than both those attorneys who did not
advertise at all and those attorneys who did not advertise the specific
service.
FTC STAFF REPORT: ACCESS TO LEGAL SERvIcES, supra note 157, at 125. Other
researchers found similar results in a survey of Phoenix attorneys. See Cox, DeSerpa &
Canby, Jr., Consumer Information and the Pricingof Legal Services, 25 J. INDUS.
ECON. 305, 315 (1982). Legal clinics that advertise heavily also have fees lower than
the mean. See Muris & McChesney, supra note 41, at 195-96.
244

According to Professor Baird:

[I]dentifying a cost of an action is not sufficient reason to decide not
to take the action. We must compare that cost . . . with the benefit we

expect to derive. If, for example, permitting advertising would reduce the
cost and improve the quality of professional services for most consumers,
advertising perhaps should be permitted even though some gullible consumers may be made worse off.
C. BAIRD, supra note 162, at 22.
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repeat sales and favorable recommendations. 2 "
B.

The Extent of Deception

With all that said, what is the extent of actual deception from
commercial speech? There are few precise data on this subject. But the
data available suggest unanimously that deception in the professions is
not a large problem. A survey taken in Florida three years after attorney advertising was allowed found no correlation between firms that
advertised and malpractice claims."'O A recent survey of state regulatory
agencies undertaken for the Federal Trade Commission found that
there was little or no problem with false advertising by doctors.24 7 In

fact, some empirical evidence suggests that more promotion is associated
with less deception. In jurisdictions free of advertising bans and restrictions on commercial practice, optometrists are less likely to prescribe
2 48

new eyeglasses unnecessarily.

In addition to this evidence, studies have repeatedly found that
consumers do not view the possibility of their being deceived by promotion as nearly the problem that professionals themselves claim it to be.
A 1979 survey found that among respondents expressing an opinion,
consumers favored allowing doctors to advertise by almost four to
one.2 Of particular interest are consumer perceptions of why professionals impose restrictions on commercial speech:
Professionals . . . say that by restricting advertising,
they are trying to protect the public against unscrupulous
245

Ferguson has argued that

with expenditures on advertising, the firm signals to consumers that it is
investing substantial sums to establish a reputation. Sales will cover these
costs only if the firm provides, and continues to provide, a good product.
Consumers choose heavily advertised brands as better buys because they
know the costs of cheating on quality are likely to be greater to these
firms, especially since most heavily advertised products are frequently purchased items which depend on repeat sales.
Ferguson, Introduction to C. BAIRD, supra note 162, at 3. For a more formal economic analysis of the correlation between advertising expenditures and product quality,
see Klein & Leffler, supra note 83, at 629-33.
246 See Survey: Ads Not Drawing Malpractice Claims, 67 A.B.A. J. 25 (1981).
247 See Braun & Braun, Advertising Health Care Professionals:Problems, Solutions and Benefits, in ADVERTISING BY HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS IN THE 80's:
PROCEEDINGS OF A NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM SPONSORED BY THE FEDERAL TRADE

COMMISSION 87 (1985).
248

See FTC

STAFF

REPORT:

ADVERTISING

RESTRICTIONS

IN

OPTOMETRY,

supra note 40, at 21 (Table 8).
24MShapiro & Bohmbach, Much Ado About Nothing Much? What's the Fuss,
Consumers Ask, ADVERTISING AGE, Dec. 24, 1979, at S-4 (opinion survey of 706 consumers on advertising by lawyers and physicians).
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practices. Consumers, on the other hand, believe that "safeguards" professionals want are designed to protect the professional, not the public.
In our surveys, eight of ten consumers believed that advertising serves a useful purpose. The respondents were also
aware that advertising today is heavily monitored by both
industry and government agencies. Many thought that is all
the protection they need.250
Other surveys in law and medicine similarly reveal that consumers
want more information from professionals rather than protection
against evils that only professionals seem to see.'" 1
It is sometimes alleged that consumers of legal services are too ignorant to know whether they had received quality services and would
not know if they had been deceived. But researchers have tested this
contention also, and found it unsupported.2 5 Consumers have shown
themselves remarkably adept at extracting truthful information about
lawyers from advertisements, even when the advertisement does not explicitly include the information.25 There is simply no reason to believe
250

Id. at S-5.

See, e.g., Dyer, Clients and Lawyers at Odds on Advertising, 2 NEw DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL SERVICES 146, 148-50 (1977); Dyer & Shimp, Reactions to Legal
Advertising, J. ADvERTISING RESEARCH, Apr. 1980, at 43, 50; Miller & Waller,
Health Care Advertising: Consumer vs. Physician Attitudes, J. ADVERTISING, Fall
1979, at 20, 22; Patterson & Swerdlow, Should Lawyers Advertise? A Study of Consumer Attitudes, 10 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 314, 322 (1982); Shapiro &
Bohmbach, supra note 249, at S-5.
252 In one study, consumers of legal services were asked to compare a legal clinic
that advertised heavily with traditional law firms that did not advertise. See Muris &
McChesney, supra note 41, at 197-201. Using seven different measures of professional
performance, consumers rated the clinic-advertiser superior. In addition to reporting
these subjective evaluations, the study then developed an objective measure of quality by
comparing the results of employing the clinic rather than traditional law firms in childsupport proceedings. Statistical tests showed that the clinic also provided superior service in an objective sense: the clinic obtained higher support awards for its female clients retaining custody of their children and lower required support payments for male
clients (though the latter difference was not statistically significant). Thus, consumers'
subjective ratings accurately reflected the objective results.
253 A controlled experiment conducted recently provides evidence in support of
this conclusion. See Patterson & Swerdlow, supra note 251. Researchers asked a sample of consumers to examine a hypothetical lawyer advertisement, consisting of a brief
slogan ("What You Don't Know Can Hurt You. Be Sure."), followed by the name and
address of the hypothetical attorney and the services provided. Consumers were then
asked to compare a lawyer who would use such an advertisement with the "typical or
average" lawyer in several respects, including age, experience, competence, and fees.
The advertisement offered no information about these characteristics. Overall, survey
respondents viewed a lawyer who would use the advertisement as younger, less experienced, and less established than an average lawyer. This impression is in fact true. See
supra Table 4, at 89. Respondents also rated the competence of the advertising lawyer
as no better or worse than that of the typical lawyer. Once again, the image conveyed
251
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that consumers are as easily deceived as some professionals seem to
believe.
Less is known about deception in connection with solicitation or
personal selling. But here again, the available evidence suggests that
consumers do not view solicitation as the evil that professionals do. As
with advertising, consumers see promotion as something a professional
does for them, not to them. In accounting, for example, a survey found
that sixty percent of business executives identified accountant "aggressiveness" in soliciting business as favorably influencing their selection
of an accounting firm. 54 In addition, a study of consumers in Scotland
found that "70% of those polled would welcome an unrequested offer of
2 55
legal services while only 2% would resent it." 1

Even if consumers were not so receptive to professional solicitation, there is no evidence that such solicitation leads to deception. Although the Court in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar258 relied on the Federal
Trade Commission's conclusion that door-to-door solicitation involves
considerable deception, 5 7 the Commission findings to which the
Ohralik opinion pointed were based on anecdotal, testimonial evidence.
True, the FTC listened to a number of "horror stories" from state officials and others, but no one had any idea whether these episodes were
squares with the empirical evidence, and may even be a bit conservative. See supra
notes 40-41 and accompanying text. Finally, consumers perceived the advertising lawyer to be less expensive than the average practitioner. Empirical evidence also verifies
this belief. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
'1 See George & Solomon, supra note 133, at 83 (The reaction by executives
"point[s] out an apparent approval of direct marketing efforts by CPA firms.").
255 Attanasio, supra note 9, at 539 n.353 (citing Campbell & Wilson, Public Attitudes to the Legal Profession in Scotland, Summary of the Research Report Presented
to the Law Society of Scotland 17-18 (1973)).
'5 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
257

Specifically, the Court found that

[t]he detrimental aspects of face-to-face selling even of ordinary consumer
products have been recognized and addressed by the Federal Trade Commission, and it hardly need be said that the potential for overreaching is
significantly greater when a lawyer, a professional trained in the art of
persuasion, personally solicits an unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay
person.
436 U.S. at 464-65 (footnotes omitted). The Court's reasoning is unpersuasive. Doorto-door salesmen are also "trained in the art of persuasion," probably far more intensively than lawyers. See, e.g., Burck, High-PressureConsumerism at the Salesman's
Door, FORTUNE, July 1972, at 70, 92 (describing sales training for door-to-door sellers
of vacuum cleaners and rug shampooers). Moreover, items sold door-to-door are often
those like encyclopedias, appliances, or furnishings that customers purchase infrequently and only rarely from the same individual. The potential for repeat sales therefore may not discipline sellers of these items the way it would professionals dependent
on repeat sales to clients and favorable recommendations from them. Again, whatever
the potential for deception, it simply may not be as much in professionals' self-interest
to attempt it. See supra text accompanying notes 232-33.
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infrequent or typical. More recently, the FTC has collected statistical
evidence, based on a random national sample, concerning consumer experience with door-to-door soliciting. Contrary to the FTC's original
assertions, the systematic evidence indicates that deception in door-todoor selling is minimal, and that consumers who are solicited door-todoor are overwhelmingly satisfied with their purchases.2 58 Thus, consumer experience with door-to-door sales suggests that deception caused
by in-person solicitation is a far smaller problem than one might have
thought.
There is no evidence on how solicitation bans affect the extent of
deception in the professions. In the absence of such evidence, the Supreme Court's refusal to impose upon state bars the burden of justifying their bans becomes all the more crucial. The American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants abandoned its ban on solicitation in 1979
under threat of antitrust action by the Department of Justice, precisely
because "the absence of persuasive evidence that direct uninvited solicitation by CPA's is likely to lead to false or misleading claims or oppressive conduct [makes] it unlikely that the ban would be upheld in a
judicial proceeding."'2 59 Absence of evidence was no problem for the
state bar in Ohralik, however. Had the state truly had the burden of
showing that deception via solicitation was a serious problem in Ohio,
one wonders to what it would have pointed.
C.

Less Restrictive Alternatives

The arguments presented in this section thus far do not deny that
some deception may occur. But a ban is a blunt weapon for regulating
whatever deception exists. Most commercial speech apparently is not
deceptive, and a ban means losing useful consumer information and
reducing competition.2 6 ° As the Supreme Court has recognized in the
advertising cases, less restrictive alternatives to outright bans may effectively mitigate problems of deception without unduly adverse consequences for buyer information or competition. 6 1
258

See

EVALUATION

(1981);

PUBLIC SECTOR RESEARCH GROUP, FINAL REPORT OF AN IMPACT
OF THE COOLING-OFF PERIOD FOR DOOR-TO-DOOR TRADE RULE

WALKER RESEARCH, INC., THREE-DAY COOLING-OFF PERIOD TRADE

RuLE

EVALUATION STUDY (1981). These studies are discussed in McChesney, Regulation
Without Evidence: The FTC's Cooling-Off Rule, J. CoNTEMP. STUD., Winter 1984, at
57, 63-65.
159 AICPA REPORT supra
note 42, at 2.
260 As Reich has stated, "Prophylactic rules designed to prevent deception will
necessarily filter out some truthful, nondeceptive speech." Reich, supra note 64, at 777.
2I See supra text accompanying notes 52-56. For a recent decision striking down
state restrictions on direct mail advertising, in part because less restrictive alternatives
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Although the Court did not consider whether less restrictive alternatives to banning solicitation exist, several in fact are available. First,
in many states, a client may discharge his attorney at any time, without
cause, regardless of any contractual relationship, and is required to pay
only in quantum meruit for any services rendered.262 If the lawyer has
deceived, the client may abrogate any contract with the lawyer and pay
only for value received. Allowing clients to discharge their attorneys
without cause and pay only for benefits conferred (net of any costs of
deception, nuisance, or harassment from solicitation) would protect clients from undesirable sales tactics without impeding the flow of truly
useful information. It would be, in short, a more efficient and equitable
rule than a total ban on solicitation.
A second remedy for deceptive or harassing tactics is perhaps even
better. Upon concluding that door-to-door selling entailed significant
potential for deception, the FTC imposed a mandatory three-day "cooling-off" period on most door-to-door sales contracts.2 "' During this period buyers may rescind their contracts merely by notifying sellers. The
bar could adopt a similar cooling-off rule for solicitations that result in
contracts covering the purchase of legal services. Such a remedy would
have resolved any problem in Ohralik, in which the one client subjected
were available, see Spencer v. Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court, 579 F. Supp.
880, 888 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
262 Quantum meruit is
[an equitable doctrine, based on the concept that no one who benefits by
the labor and materials of another should be unjustly enriched thereby;
under those circumstances, the law implies a promise to pay a reasonable
amount for the labor and materials furnished, even absent a specific contract therefor.

see, e.g., Heinzman v. Fine, Fine,
Legum & Fine, 217 Va. 958, 234 S.E.2d 282 (1977). See generally Annot., 92
A.L.R.3d 690 (1979) (discussing quantum meruit recovery cases). At least 19 jurisdictions apply the rule allowing discharge of an attorney with payment only in quantum
meruit. See id. at 694-96. This rule was apparently not the law in Ohio, however, at
the time the Ohralik case arose. See Dombey, Tyler, Richards & Grieser v. Detroit, T.
& I.R.R., 351 F.2d 121, 127 (6th Cir. 1965) (applying Ohio law that a full contractual
contingent fee is recoverable when a client discharges an attorney without cause). Although still not the majority rule, the rule allowing liberal discharge of one's attorney
with payment only in quantum meruit is described as the "modern rule," because the
trend appears to be toward greater liberalization. See Casenote, 51 UMKC L. REv.
373 (1983) (discussing recent cases).
26 See 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (1985). A mandatory cooling-off period is used in other
contexts to remedy possible deception or "high-pressure" tactics. See Truth in Lending
Act § 125, 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1982) (describing the right of rescission of a consumer
credit transaction involving a security interest on the principal place of dwelling); see
also Gerasta v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 411 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. La. 1976) (recognizing
the right of rescission under the Truth in Lending Act); cf. 16 C.F.R. § 438.2 (1985)
(addressing the rescission of vocational school enrollment contracts).
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1119 (5th ed. 1979);
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to alleged "high-pressure" tactics attempted to rescind within a day. 64
A cooling-off rule is self-enforcing: it requires only that sellers give to
buyers a cancellation form and a conspicuous, written statement of buyers' rescission rights. A cooling-off rule would be a cheaper and speedier remedy for clients than the bar's grievance machinery.2 6
Rescission that directly combats deception, rather than a total ban
that blocks even truthful speech, comports far better with the first
amendment values underlying the commercial speech doctrine. In the
first place, rescission is more consistent with the rationale of the advertising cases, in which the Court has required that restrictions on speech
be narrowly drawn in order not to interfere with the flow of truthful
information. Notably, although the FTC determined that door-to-door
selling was inherently and actually deceptive, 6 ' the agency imposed
only a three-day period for rescission following supposedly deceptive
solicitations. On the other hand, faced with a case in which no deception had actually occurred and in which admittedly useful information
had been communicated, the Supreme Court upheld a total ban on the
solicitation because of its mere "potential for harm."2 A rescission period would avoid many of the supposed evils of solicitation without loss
of the benefits. Problems stemming from solicitation not remedied by a
24 "High pressure" and lack of an opportunity for reflection were arguably a
problem for the passenger client, whom Ohralik visited unbidden and from whom he
almost immediately obtained oral assent for his representation. But the girl and her
mother attempted to rescind the agreement the next day. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 45152. Even a brief cooling-off period would have allowed the rescission. The other client,
who drove the car, experienced no high pressure or lack of time for reflection in the
first place. Before Ohralik visited her, he telephoned and then visited the client's
mother, who agreed to his contacting her injured daughter in the hospital. It was her
parents who later told Ohralik that their daughter had agreed to his representing her.
Ohralik did not return to the hospital to have the girl sign his contingency agreement
until two days later. See id. at 449-50.
265 Contracts for the purchase of legal services induced by lawyer solicitation
would seem already to be covered by the FTC Cooling-Off Rule. The Rule applies to a

sale, lease, or rental of consumer goods or services with a purchase price of
$25 or more . . .in which the seller or his representative personally solicits the sale, .. . and the buyer's agreement or offer to purchase is
made at a place other than the place of business of the seller.
16 C.F.R. § 429.1 note 1(a) (1985). "Consumer goods or services," id. at note 1(b),
appear to include personal legal services purchased by individuals, such as tax advice,
divorces, wills, and so forth. Legal services are not among the listed exemptions to the
rule. See id. at note 1(a)(4) (exempting transactions conducted entirely by mail or telephone); id. at note 1(a)(6) (exempting real estate, insurance, and security sales). Nevertheless, soliciting for legal services clearly was not the type of solicitation the FTC
sought to regulate by the Rule. The Rule has apparently never been applied to legal
solicitation.
266 See FTC: Cooling-Off Period, supra note 100, at 22,934 (1972); McChesney,
supra note 258.
2617Ohralik,

436 U.S. at 464.
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cooling-off period could be handled by allowing clients to rescind their
contracts at any time without cause and pay only in quantum meruit.
There are other alternatives for correcting deception that the
Court did not consider. Although fraud and deception can (and doubtless do) occur in every industry, almost all of the problems are handled
case-by-case as they arise. For example, every state legislatively outlaws "unfair and deceptive acts and practices.12 8 There is no evidence
that treating problems of deception in professional promotion cannot be
handled adequately under such statutes; indeed, the more liberal jurisdictions already judge lawyer advertising solely under these general criteria.2 6 9 In England, advertising by solicitors was traditionally allowed,
subject only to scrutiny to avoid misleading the public.2 7 0 This standard

is the one established in the new ABA Model Rules, not just for advertising, but for use of trade names.27 1 Virginia and Washington, D.C.
have similar rules on solicitation, allowing it in all but carefully limited
circumstances, and have apparently experienced no unusual deception
problems.27 2 In general, the beneficial results of liberalized promotional
See supra note 56.
In Wisconsin, for example, the state bar reacted to the Bates decision by proposing a "very narrow and specific set of rules which prohibited any form of advertising not addressed by the Bates court." Note, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 168, 171 (1983) (footnote omitted). The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the proposals and prohibited
only advertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading. Thus the Wisconsin rules "treat
advertising by lawyers no differently from advertising generally." Id. at 172 (footnote
omitted). Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, on its own motion, replaced the
restrictive rules submitted by the state bar with rules that would prohibit only false or
misleading advertisements, advertisements likely to create unjustified expectations of
favorable results, or advertisements facilitating otherwise unlawful acts. 5 Md. Admin.
Reg. 56 (1978); see Comment, Attorney Advertising in Maryland.A Need for Stricter
Control, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 92, 105-08 (1983).
270 See Attanasio, supra note 9, at 495-96. The evolution of the English rules
surrounding solicitor advertising offers considerable support for the predatory view of
promotional restrictions explained in this article. See supra text accompanying notes
196-211. Solicitor advertising was permitted as long as the courts themselves regulated
solicitors. In 1933, however, Parliament shifted regulatory responsibility to the English
Law Society, the professional association of solicitors. The following year, the Law
Society adopted prior restraints on "touting," which it defined as attracting business by
undercutting statutory or customary rates. In 1936, the Law Society included solicitor
advertising as "touting," and so banned it. See Attanasio, supra note 9, at 495-96.
271 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 7.2, 7.5(a) (1983).
27 See Disciplinary Rules of the District of Columbia Bar, DR 2-103(A) (1981).
The District of Columbia rule essentially prohibits only solicitation that is false, solicitation that constitutes undue influence, or solicitation that targets a person unable to
exercise reasonable judgment in selecting a lawyer. The District's favorable experience
with liberal solicitation rules is noted in Attorney Solicitation: The Scope of State Regulation After Primus and Ohralik, 12 U. MICH.J. L. REF. 144, 180 (1978); see also
McGrath Letter, supra note 15, at 6 ("After checking with Bar Counsel in the District
of Columbia and Virginia, we are aware of no evidence that their adoption of such
[liberal] rules has led to solicitation fraught with 'undue influence, intimidation and
over-reaching' of the public.").
288
209
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rules have stood in "stark contrast to the ogre predicted by the
doomsayers. "273
Up to this point, one alleged remedy for deception, bar requirements for inclusion of additional information in commercial speech, has
not been considered here. The omission is intentional. The additional
information required to supplement potentially deceptive speech may be
just as misleading to an audience as the original message itself, however
truthful but incomplete the first message was.17 4 Worse, as long as the
bar need not specify ex ante precisely the sorts of information that must
be disclosed in an ad,27 5 it can always allege, after the fact, that information necessary to avoid deception was omitted. The lawyer is placed
in a no-win situation. No advertisement or other commercial message
Joe Sims has observed that
there is as yet no sign that the moral or professional (assuming there is a
difference) fabric of the D.C. Bar has unraveled as a result of [its] standard, nor is there any evidence that that rule has had any adverse effects
on the consumers of legal services....
Since the Virginia Bar has not yet crumbled [after adopting solicitation rules similar to those in D.C.], perhaps less traditional states will
now be encouraged to join the parade.
Sims, supra note 112, at 14, col. 4, 19, col. 3.
27 Attanasio, supra note 9, at 540.
274 A review of the empirical evidence on corrective advertisements and affirmative
disclosures in advertising concludes that "remedial statements may be at least as confusing and misleading as the advertising they are designed to counteract." Jacoby, Nelson
& Hoyer, supra note 225, at 62 (citing prior studies of audience comprehension of
corrective advertising). Lawyers are generally not experts at appraising the inferences
consumers will make from mandated additional disclosures. "The difficulty involved in
accurately communicating meaning is often underestimated, and regulators would seem
to be no exception in this regard." Id. at 68.
For a good example of judicial sensitivity to this problem, see Spencer v. Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court, 579 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Pa. 1984). In that case, the
court invalidated a state requirement that a lawyer promoting himself as limiting his
practice to certain areas also include a disclaimer that he was not recognized or certified
as a specialist in those fields. The court reasoned:
By requiring a lawyer to state clearly that he or his law firm is neither
recognized nor certified as a specialist in any limited field of practice, [the
rule] contains the possible implication that the advertising lawyer is not a
recognized or certified specialist but that other lawyers may be. . . . Such
a negative implication may cause lawyers to decline to list any fields of
concentration simply to avoid the requirement of including the damaging
disclaimer. This would be unfortunate because useful and otherwise protected information concerning the nature of a lawyer's practice would be
suppressed.
Id. at 891-92 (footnote omitted).
2175See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S.Ct. 2265, 2282 (1985)
(A state is free to specify, after the fact, what additional information should have been
included "as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers.").
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can possibly contain all the information of relevance to a consumer
purchase decision. Rather, an ad may suggest that a consumer consult a
professional for further information. In a subsequent consultation, more
complete and precise information can be made available. Demanding
that all relevant information be included in a commercial message ignores the interplay between the initial message and the follow-up meeting in informing consumers.
The possibility that a lawyer will be disciplined for failure to include additional information in a truthful commercial message will reduce the number of messages that attorneys will disseminate in the first
place. The likelihood that ex post disclosure requirements will be used
to discipline lawyers is even greater if the bar uses mandatory disclosure predatorily. Suspicions as to the bar's motives are not allayed by
observation of the bar's reaction when lawyers seek guidance as to
whether additional information should be included in commercial
messages. In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,276 for example, the attorney had submitted his advertisement to the bar for its review and advice. The bar refused to advise him, waited until the advertisement had run and then initiated disciplinary proceedings for failure
to disclose necessary additional information.
In summary, although restrictive regulatory solutions for deception
may be appropriate, the Court itself recognized in the advertising cases
that the state bars may have a tendency to exaggerate the extent of any
problem. As the experience with alleged deception in door-to-door selling indicates, before approving the most drastic remedy available-complete prohibition of the particular form of speech involved-the Court should require better empirical evidence on the
magnitude of deception. In addition, the Court should reexamine less
drastic means of mitigating genuine problems of deception.
CONCLUSION

Withholding constitutional protection from commercial speech
276

105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).

277 See id. at 2289 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see

also Leoni v. State Bar of California, 704 P.2d 183, 186-87, 217 Cal. Rptr. 423, 427
(1985) (After receiving an outline of attorneys' direct mail campaign and copies of
letters to be mailed, the California Bar thanked them for their "good intentions" and
then waited for two years while the campaign continued before beginning disciplinary
proceedings.). In Leoni, the California Supreme Court reduced the 30-day suspension
imposed on the attorneys to a public reprimand and commented that "[w]e hope the
State Bar will assist its members in acting in accordance (with the solicitation rule],
rather than, as in the instant case, only initiating disciplinary proceedings." Leoni, 704
P.2d at 195, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
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when there is merely a possibility that it will mislead, as the Supreme
Court has done with nonadvertising forms of commercial speech, is inconsistent with the policy and the analysis of the commercial speech
27 8
doctrine as it originally developed. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,
the majority rejected dissenting Justice Powell's argument that advertising would necessarily mislead some consumers and so could constitutionally be banned. Yet the Court accepts the same deception rationale
in upholding bans on other commercial speech-speech which is no
more inherently deceptive than advertising. All forms of commercial
speech can be deceptive; all can be truthful. The Court has not articulated any constitutional justification for applying different burdens of
proving deception when different forms of commercial speech are challenged. Furthermore, the Court has not explained why states are not
limited to least restrictive alternatives in regulating nonadvertising deception, as they are when deception comes via advertising.
Aside from contradictions and inconsistencies in the Court's commercial speech opinions, the Court has failed to consider a point raised
by lawyers, judges, and other commentators: the possibility that promotional restrictions have much less to do with protecting consumers than
with hobbling those professionals to whom promotion is particularly
useful. "To many lawyers, the main 'evil of unrestricted solicitation' is
its pro-competitive potential."2 79 The Court noted in Bates that "cynicism with regard to the [legal] profession may be created by the fact
that it long has publicly eschewed advertising, while condoning the actions of the attorney who structures his social or civic associations so as
to provide contacts with potential clients."2 " The cynicism created by
the Court's treatment of solicitation and trade names may be no less.
Particularly unfortunate is the ease with which the professional associations have convinced the Court of the purity of their motives in
ferreting out deception.
This article suggests that stated concerns about deception may
mask predatory reasons for traditional restrictions on promotion. If it is
433 U.S. 350 (1977).
Sims, supra note 12, at 59.
280 Bates, 433 U.S. at 370-71. One example of such cynicism on the part of a
prominent non-lawyer is the following:
278

270

One of the greatest failings of the organized bar in the past century . . . is that it has fought innovations. When greater competition has
come to the legal profession, . . . when lawyers have begun to advertise
or compete-in short, when the profession has accommodated the interests
of the public-[the bar] has done so only when forced to.
President Carter'sAttack on Lawyers, PresidentSpann's Response, and ChiefJustice
Burger's Remarks, 64 A.B.A. J. 840, 845 (1978) (President Carter's speech).
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in some professionals' interest to advertise or solicit, it may be in their
competitors' interest to prevent advertising and solicitation. Given that
small-firm and less-established lawyers find advertising, solicitation and
referral fees more useful than others do, there can be no question that
the bar's traditional restrictions on promotion have hurt these two
groups of attorneys. There is no direct evidence that the bar has been
anything but an unwitting participant in reducing competition. But the
bar's preference for combatting deception by the draconian measure of
banning even beneficial commercial speech is perhaps telling. The alacrity with which the organized bar and other professional associations
throw the baby out with the bath-water strongly suggests that they
want to get rid of both.

